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With All My Worldly Goods I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not:          
A Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act After 
Three Decades 
J. THOMAS OLDHAM* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As Hogarth reminds us, in English society when children of the wealthy 
marry it has been common for centuries for the parties (or their parents) to 
negotiate an agreement before marriage regarding the couple’s finances.1  In 
more recent times in the United States, couples marrying later in life after raising 
children with another partner frequently have signed premarital agreements 
clarifying their respective inheritance rights, and such agreements have generally 
been enforced.  What is relatively new in Anglo-American law is the acceptance 
of the idea that prospective spouses via a premarital agreement can alter the 
parties’ respective rights and obligations if they divorce. 
This novel idea (for a non-civil law country) was first announced in the U.S. 
in an opinion written by the Florida Supreme Court in 1970.2  In the early 1980s, 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws authorized a 
group to attempt to draft a uniform law outlining the rules that should govern 
how to determine whether to enforce such an agreement.  The result was the 
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (the UPAA), which was promulgated in 
1983.  Since then, some states have adopted the UPAA.  Many have not adopted 
it or have adopted it with some modifications. 
During the past four decades, all U.S. states have accepted the general idea 
that spouses may make an enforceable agreement specifying the economic 
consequences of divorce.  There is substantial disagreement, however, regarding 
whether the right to spousal support can be affected, as well as which rules 
ought to be applied to determine whether to enforce the agreement.  States 
disagree both as to the mandated procedural requirements for entering into such 
agreements as well whether there should be some sort of review of the 
 
 *   John Freeman Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.  I would like to thank 
Professors Bill Atkin, Nick Bala, Nina Dethloff, and Patrick Parkinson for help with the comparative 
information set forth in this article.  Barbara Atwood, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone and Judith Younger 
provided helpful comments to earlier drafts.  I would also like to thank UHLC law student Lisa 
Baiocchi-Mooney for her research assistance, Dan Baker for obtaining numerous books, periodicals, 
and cases from the library, and Amanda Parker for her speedy and careful administrative help. 
 1.  See HOGARTH’S MARRIAGE À-LA-MODE (Judy Egerton, ed. 1997); Lloyd Bonfield, Property 
Settlements on Marriage in England from the Anglo-Saxons to the Mid-Eighteenth Century, in MARRIAGE, 
PROPERTY, AND SUCCESSION 287, 292–93 (Lloyd Bonfield ed., 1992); LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, 
SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500–1800, at 30–31, 87 (1977).  For a French perspective, see 
generally HONORÉ DE BALZAC, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1835). 
 2.  Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970). 
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substantive fairness of the agreement either at the time of signing or at divorce.  
The UPAA reflects a policy judgment that there should not be substantial 
procedural requirements for entering into such agreements and that no review of 
the fairness of the agreement at divorce is appropriate.  In this regard, the policy 
judgments reflected in the UPAA differ from those adopted in a number of other 
states and other countries during the three decades since promulgation of the 
UPAA. 
In 2010, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
appointed a committee to draft a new uniform act to set forth, among other 
things, standards for determining the enforceability of premarital agreements.  
The committee presumably will review the UPAA and consider whether any 
modification of the UPAA would now be appropriate.3  This article will compare 
the provisions of the UPAA to the rules now applied in states that have not 
adopted the UPAA and in other countries to determine when to enforce a 
premarital agreement that contemplates divorce.  I will argue that the UPAA is 
not consistent with the consensus evolving in other states and countries 
regarding what needs to be established before a premarital agreement should be 
enforced.  I will suggest various possible amendments to the UPAA so the UPAA 
could be made more consistent with rules in other states and international 
trends. 
II. STATES THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE UPAA 
A. Those States That Adopted the UPAA in Its Entirety 
Thirteen states have adopted the UPAA with no significant changes.4  The 
uniform act authorizes both the restriction or elimination of divisible property 
upon divorce5 and the restriction or elimination of spousal support.6  A waiver of 
spousal support is effective unless the lack of support would cause a party to 
become a public charge; if this would occur, the court is authorized to award 
support in an amount sufficient to avoid such a result.7  An agreement is 
presumptively valid, and the person challenging the agreement has the burden 
to show it is not enforceable.  To overturn an agreement, the challenging party 
must show either that the agreement was: (i) not signed “voluntarily” (not 
 
 3.  To view the Committee list and links to related documents, see Premarital and Marital 
Agreements, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/committee.aspx?title=Premarital%20 
and%20marital%20Agreements (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).  The committee expects to present a draft 
for final approval in July 2012.  Id. 
 4.   See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-201 et seq. (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-401 et seq. (2009); 
DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13, § 321 et seq. (2009); HAW, REV. STAT. § 572D-1 et seq. (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 32-921 et seq. (2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., 40/2601 et seq. (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-
801 et seq. (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-601 et seq. (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42.1001 et seq. (2011); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52B-1 et seq. (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 108.700 et seq. (2009); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 4.001 et seq. (Vernon 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-147 et seq. (2011); D.C. CODE § 46-501 et 
seq. (2005). 
 5.  UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, §3(3), 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001). 
 6.  See id. § 3(4). 
 7.  See id. § 6(b). 
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defined)8 or (ii) “unconscionable” (not defined) when signed, and that the person 
challenging the agreement did not receive adequate disclosure of financial 
information regarding the other party, did not waive the right to such 
information, and did not otherwise have access to such information.9  In other 
words, an agreement that is unconscionable when signed is still enforceable if 
there was adequate disclosure of financial information, a waiver of the right to 
disclosure, or the party otherwise had access to such information.  Any change in 
the circumstances of the parties after the wedding is not relevant to the issue of 
enforcement.  The receipt of advice from independent counsel might be relevant 
to the issue of voluntary execution but is not required.10 
B. Those Adopting States That Made Changes to the UPAA 
i. Voluntary Execution 
In contrast to the thirteen states that adopted the UPAA without substantial 
revision, a significant number of other states chose to adopt the UPAA, but only 
after some revisions.  For example, the California version of the UPAA contains 
significant changes.11  The UPAA specifies that an agreement should not be 
enforced if it is not signed voluntarily;12 no definition of voluntariness is given, 
nor are any factors listed that should be taken into consideration when making 
this determination.  In contrast, the California statute attempts to clarify the 
standard for voluntary execution.  The statute specifies that an agreement should 
be found to be voluntarily signed only if: (i) the party against whom enforcement 
is sought either had independent counsel or waived that right in writing; (ii) the 
party against whom enforcement is sought was given at least seven days to 
consider whether to sign the agreement; and (iii) the party against whom 
enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by counsel, was fully informed in 
writing of the terms and basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and 
obligations he or she was giving up  by signing the agreement.13 
Other state versions of the UPAA have modified the provision pertaining to 
voluntary execution.  The Florida statute lets a party challenge an agreement 
either on the ground of “involuntariness” or by showing that the agreement was 
procured by “fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching.”14  In Rhode Island, an 
agreement may be challenged only if it is shown that the agreement was not 
voluntarily signed, the agreement was unconscionable when signed, and the 
challenging party did not receive adequate financial information.15 
 
 8.  See id. § 6(a)(1). 
 9.  See id. § 6(a)(2). 
 10.  See generally id. §6. 
 11.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c) (West 2004). 
 12.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(1). 
 13.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c). 
 14.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.079 (7) (West 2011). 
 15.  See R. I. GEN. LAWS § 15-17-6 (2003). 
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ii. Unconscionability 
Likewise, many states that have adopted the UPAA changed the rules 
applicable to challenging the agreement based on unconscionability. To 
challenge an agreement under the UPAA on the ground of unconscionability, the 
uniform act requires a substantial showing.16  First, the agreement must be found 
to be unconscionable at the time of signing (not at the time of divorce).17  If this is 
established, the challenging party must also show that the financial disclosure to 
that party was inadequate, that the objecting party did not waive the right to 
such disclosure, and that the objecting party did not otherwise know that 
information.18 
A number of states have modified this provision in some manner.  For 
example, under the Connecticut provision, the agreement is not to be enforced if 
it is unconscionable either at the time of signing or when it is to be enforced.19  
An agreement can be successfully challenged in Indiana or Nevada by 
establishing that the agreement was unconscionable at the time of signing, 
regardless of whether there was adequate disclosure of financial information.20  
In New Jersey, an agreement can be successfully challenged if unconscionable 
when enforcement is sought.21  In North Dakota, if enforcement of the agreement 
would be unconscionable, the court may: (i) refuse to enforce it in its entirety, (ii) 
enforce a severable portion of the agreement without the unconscionable 
provisions, or (iii) limit the application of the unconscionable provisions to avoid 
an unconscionable result.22 
The UPAA does not define “unconscionable.”23  One state has attempted to 
clarify the meaning of this term.  In New Jersey, an agreement is unconscionable 
if it leaves a party without a means of reasonable support or would provide a 
standard of living for a party far below what the party enjoyed before the 
marriage.24 
iii. Limiting Spousal Support 
The UPAA authorizes the elimination of spousal support and does not 
permit a review of the fairness of such a provision at divorce unless the waiving 
party would become a public charge.  Some states have made it easier to 
challenge an alimony waiver.  For example, in Indiana an alimony waiver is not 
fully enforceable if the waiver would cause extreme hardship under 
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable at the time of signing.25  If this occurs, 
 
 16.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § (6)(a)(2). 
 17.  See id. 
 18.  See id. 
 19.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g(a)(2) (West 2009). 
 20.  See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8 (West 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123A.080 (2010). 
 21.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-37 (West 2002). 
 22.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2009). 
 23.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1. 
 24.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-32 (West 2011). 
 25.  See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8. 
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the court may award support to the extent necessary to avoid that hardship.26  In 
Iowa, South Dakota, and New Mexico, an agreement cannot impact the right to 
spousal support.27  Additionally, a waiver of spousal support could be 
challenged as unconscionable at the time of divorce in Connecticut, New Jersey, 
or North Dakota, as discussed in the preceding section.28 
California sets forth more detailed rules regarding agreements limiting 
spousal support.  A provision restricting the right to spousal support is not 
enforceable if: (i) the party against whom enforcement is sought was not 
represented by independent counsel in connection with signing the agreement, 
or (ii) the provision is unconscionable at the time of enforcement.29 
iv.  Inadequate Disclosure 
In some “adopting” states, an agreement is not enforceable if the 
challenging party was not given fair and reasonable financial information, did 
not waive the right to such information, and did not already know the 
information, regardless of whether the agreement was also unconscionable when 
signed.30  The Connecticut statute seems to compel financial disclosure; there is 
no mention of satisfying this requirement via a waiver or some other way of 
informally acquiring this information.31  In Arkansas, a waiver of the right to 
receive disclosure of financial information is valid only if the party was 
represented by counsel.32 
Under the UPAA the challenging party must show that he or she did not 
receive “fair and reasonable” disclosure.33  The California statute demands proof 
of “fair, reasonable and full” disclosure.34 
v. Other Provisions 
Some states that adopted the UPAA have added additional rules.  For 
example, in Maine an agreement is void eighteen months after the parties 
become biological or adoptive parents unless the parties reaffirm the agreement 
during that period.35 
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  See IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.5 (West 2001); N. M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3A-4 (2011); Sanford v. 
Sanford, 694 N.W.2d 283, 289 (S.D. 2005). 
 28.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g(a)(2) (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-37; N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2009). 
 29.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (West 2004). 
 30.  See IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.8(3); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123A.080 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 37.2-38(c). 
 31.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. Ann. § 46b-36g (West 2009). 
 32.  ARK. CODE ANN. §9-11-406(a)(2)(ii) (2009). 
 33.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2), 9C U.L.A. 49 (2001). 
 34.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(a)(2)(A). 
 35.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A § 606 (1998).  This provision does not apply to agreements 
signed after October 1, 1993.  Id.  For a general survey of the manner in which some adopting states 
modified the UPAA, see generally Amberlynn Curry, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Its 
Variations Throughout the States, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 355 (2010). 
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C. Summary 
About half of all states have adopted the UPAA in some form.  However, 
before enactment many adopting states altered the uniform law in one or more 
material ways that make it easier to challenge a premarital agreement.  For 
example, in some states the unconscionability of the agreement is to be 
determined at divorce, not the time of signing, and in a number of states a 
finding of unconscionability alone is grounds for a successful challenge.  Others 
do not permit a limitation on the right to spousal support or require independent 
counsel as a condition of such a provision.  California has endeavored to clarify 
how to determine whether an agreement was signed “voluntarily,” while New 
Jersey has attempted to define what an “unconscionable” agreement is.  If the 
parties have a biologic or adoptive child during marriage, to maintain the 
effectiveness of the agreement for agreements signed before 1993, Maine 
required parties to reaffirm the agreement soon after the arrival of a biological or 
adoptive child.  So, a significant number of “adopting” states disagree with one 
or more basic policy judgments reflected in the UPAA. 
III. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
About half of all states have not adopted the UPAA, and many apply 
standards significantly different from the UPAA to determine whether to enforce 
such agreements.  The discussion below compares the policy judgments 
incorporated into the UPAA to the rules now applied in states that have not 
adopted the UPAA to determine whether to enforce a premarital agreement. 
A. Voluntary Execution 
Almost all states theoretically require premarital agreements to be signed 
voluntarily or without duress.  States have tended to construe both terms 
similarly. 
i. Involuntariness 
While the UPAA requires voluntary execution, it provides no additional 
guidance about how to determine whether execution is voluntary or involuntary.  
The California Supreme Court discussed the factors it felt should be relevant to a 
determination of voluntary execution in In re Marriage of Bonds.36  The court 
concluded that these factors should focus on: the relative bargaining power of 
the parties; whether there was coercion; whether the agreement was signed 
shortly before the wedding; the presence of independent counsel for the waiving 
party; and whether the waiving party understood the terms, purpose, and effect 
of the agreement.37  Since the Bonds case, some other courts have generally 
approved of this analysis.38 
 
 36.  In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 824–26 (Cal. 2000). 
 37.  Id. at 824–26. 
 38.  See In re Estate of Smid, 756 N.W.2d 1, 16 (S.D. 2008); In re Marriage of Rudder, 217 P.3d 183, 
189–91 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
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The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that “the timing of the 
agreement is of paramount importance in assessing whether [an agreement was 
voluntarily signed].”39  Another approach is to look to Black’s Law Dictionary, 
which defines “voluntary” as “intentionally; without coercion.”40  Some courts 
equate a voluntarily executed premarital agreement with one free from duress or 
undue influence.41  Duress requires a wrongful or unlawful threat which gives 
the other party no reasonable alternative.42  Undue influence is influence that 
deprives a person of his or her freedom of choice.43 
Regardless of whether UPAA courts apply the Bonds factors to determine 
voluntary execution or consider whether there was duress or undue influence, 
what is remarkable is that many courts have upheld the agreement despite unfair 
bargaining tactics.  Although in rare instances a premarital agreement provides 
additional rights to the spouse with fewer assets,44 the “stereotypic” voluntary 
execution case involves this scenario: the wealthier party decides he or she wants 
a premarital agreement to limit the other party’s financial claims if the parties 
divorce.45  The wealthier party instructs his or her lawyer to draft an agreement 
 
 39.  Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533, 551 (Conn. 2007) (quoting 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and Wife § 
101). 
 40.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1605 (8th ed. 2004).  For cases that have considered this definition, 
see In re Rudder, 217 P.3d at 190; In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 512 (Iowa 2008). 
 41.  See In re Shanks, 758 N.W.2d at 512. 
 42.  Id. at 513. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See Marsh v. Marsh, 949 S.W.2d 734, 737–38 (Tex. App. 1997); Weber v. Weber, 589 N.W.2d 
358, 359 (N.D. 1999); Carnell v. Carnell, 398 So.2d 503 (Fla. App. 1981). 
 45.  See In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003) (involving a party desiring an agreement 
who had a net worth of $6,000,000 while the other party’s assets were worth $5,000); Mallen v. 
Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 2005) (involving proponent with net worth of $8,500,000 while the other 
party’s assets were worth $10,000); Hoag v. Dick, 799 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002) (involving proponent of 
agreement who owned assets worth more than $1,000,000 while the other owned assets of “negligible 
value”); Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So.2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (involving proponent’s assets worth 
$800,000 with the other’s worth $12,000); Potts v. Potts, 303 S.W.3d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (involving 
proponent who had assets of $627,000 while the other party’s assets were worth  $5,000); Hiemstra v. 
Hiemstra, 2010 WL 1433880 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (involving proponent who had a net 
worth of about $6 million while the other party’s net worth was less than $200,000); Austin v. Austin, 
839 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 2005) (involving proponent’s net worth of $1,000,000 where the waiving 
party’s assets were worth $35,000); Wiethe v. Beaty, 1999 WL 74595 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (involving 
proponent who owned $2,000,000 in assets while the other party owned assets worth $441,000); 
McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989) (involving proponent with net worth of 
$1,400,000 while the other party’s assets were worth $100,000); In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 
(Cal. 2000) (involving proponent whose annual income at the time of signing was $106,000 in the late 
1980s and likely to increase while the waiving party “had worked as a waitress and a bartender”); 
Edwards v. Edwards, 744 N.W.2d 243 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (involving proponent’s assets which 
exceeded $1,700,000 while the waiving party’s assets were worth $28,000); In re Marriage of Barnes, 
755 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (involving proponent’s annual salary which was “in excess of” 
$250,000 (plus “various perks”) at the time of execution while the waiving party’s annual salary was 
$19,000); Margulies v. Margulies, 491 So.2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (involving proponent who 
had a net worth of at least $50 million while the other party was a flight attendant); Sogg v. Nev. State 
Bank, 832 P.2d 781 (Nev. 1992) (involving proponent’s net worth of $20 million where the other party 
did not have “substantial financial resources”); Warren v. Warren, 523 N.E.2d 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) 
(involving proponent who was a multimillionaire while the other party was a secretary); DeMatteo v. 
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that protects that party and limits the claims of the other party (or perhaps even 
eliminates such claims) if the parties divorce.  The wealthier party then presents 
the agreement to the other party shortly before the planned wedding, frequently 
a day or two before, and states that he or she is willing to marry only if the 
agreement is signed.46  This leaves the less wealthy party belatedly learning of 
the agreement in a very difficult situation.  That party has to decide whether to 
try to get legal advice and, if legal advice is desired, to determine how to obtain 
competent advice within twenty-four or forty-eight hours, and perhaps on a 
weekend day when most lawyers are not in their offices.  Then the party must 
attempt to negotiate the agreement at the last minute and decide whether to sign 
the agreement or postpone or cancel the wedding after guests from out of town 
have begun to arrive. 
In many cases, the wealthy party presents the agreement and states that he 
or she will not marry unless it is signed.  This is generally not perceived by 
courts to be unfair bargaining.  Each party is thought to be under no obligation to 
marry and can set forth certain prerequisites and conditions that must be 
satisfied before he or she will marry.47  As a general principle, it is not unfair 
bargaining for a person to specify to his partner the terms based upon which the 
party would be willing to marry.  Whether it is unfair bargaining to present an 
agreement at the last minute and then tell your partner that the marriage will 
occur only if the partner signs it is another matter. 
 
DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (involving proponent who owned assets valued in excess of 
$83 million while the other party had a net worth of less than $5,000); Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533 
(Conn. 2007) (involving proponent with net worth of $6.5 million, while the other party owned assets 
amounting to $22,000); Gardner v. Gardner, 527 N.W.2d 701 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (involving 
proponent whose assets amounted to more than $3 million while the assets of the other party 
amounted to $22,000); Adams v. Adams, 603 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. 2004) (involving proponent whose assets 
were valued at $4,526,708 while the other party’s were worth $30,000); In re Marriage of Berger, 829 
N.E.2d 876 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (involving proponent who owned assets worth $10 million while the 
other party’s net worth was $149,000); Millstein v. Millstein, 2002 WL 31031676 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) 
(involving proponent whose net worth was $28 million while the other party’s assets were worth 
$10,000).  This certainly is the normal assumption lawyers make about the purpose of a premarital 
agreement.  See, e.g., Premarital Agreement Basic Form: Anticipating the Needs of the Monied Spouse, 18 
FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1995, at 8–9.  Professor Atwood notes that the party being asked to waive 
rights frequently is the woman.  See Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns About 
the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. Legis. 127, 133 n.29 (1993).  Of course, women do 
sometimes propose a premarital agreement to protect their wealth.  For example, the recent highly 
publicized case of Radmacher v. Granatino decided by the English Supreme Court involved an 
agreement intended to protect Ms. Radmacher’s wealth. See Ian Cowie, Hedging Your Romantic Bets, 
Daily Telegraph, Oct. 23, 2010, at 11.  Britney Spears signed a premarital agreement with Kevin 
Federline that eventually limited his financial claims in their divorce.  See Jamie Doward, Prenuptial 
Agreements on Rise Amongst Younger Men, Observer, July 17, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2010/jul/18/prenuptial-agreements-rise-males.  John 
Kerry signed a premarital agreement before he married Teresa Heinz.  Id. 
 46.  For example, the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated: “Our research has disclosed that it is a 
common practice to present antenuptial agreements at the eleventh hour before the wedding 
ceremony.”  See Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1348 (Ohio 1994). 
 47.  See, e.g., Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 815 (Ga. 2005); Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509, 
511 (Tex. App. 2002); Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d. 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Liebelt 
v. Liebelt, 801 P.2d. 52 (Idaho. App. 1990).  See generally J.T. OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY (2010)  § 4.03[4] nn.72 & 73.. 
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In some cases of this nature, courts have concluded the agreement was 
involuntarily signed.48  For example, in Marriage of Rudder,49 the parties planned 
to meet at the office of the husband’s lawyer the day before they were to leave 
town to marry.50  The wife asked her prospective husband and his lawyer to be 
sure that her long-time lawyer would also be present to give her advice.51  When 
she arrived at the meeting, her lawyer was not there, apparently because neither 
her husband nor his lawyer notified her lawyer of the meeting.52  The husband 
gave the wife a draft of the agreement, which waived all marital rights and the 
right to claim spousal support.53  The husband’s financial disclosure was general 
and did not attempt to place a value on any of his assets.54  The husband 
encouraged the wife to sign the agreement even though her lawyer had not 
reviewed it or discussed it with her.55  She signed the agreement.56  The trial 
court found the wife was relatively unsophisticated in financial matters.57  The 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the agreement was 
involuntarily signed.58 
In another case,59 the prospective bride quit her job, lost her housing, and 
traveled from Russia to Montana intending to marry her fiancé.60  If she did not 
marry him, she could not remain in the U.S.61  Shortly before the wedding, after 
she had come to the U.S., the husband presented her with a premarital 
agreement drafted by his lawyer.62  The husband hired a lawyer to talk to his 
prospective wife, who did not understand much English, and the lawyer selected 
did not speak Russian.63  The wife signed the agreement.64  The trial court found 
that the prospective wife had quit her previous job and come to Montana 
(bringing with her a child from a prior relationship) with “extremely limited 
assets.”65  Her prospective husband stated he would not marry without a signed 
premarital agreement.66  If she didn’t marry him, she would need to somehow 
find the resources to return to Russia with her child and find a job and a place to 
 
 48.  See generally OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, supra note 47 at § 4.03[4] n.58. 
 49.  217 P.3d 183 (Or. Ct. App. 2009). 
 50.  Id. at 188. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 195. 
 58.  Id. at 194. 
 59.  In re Marriage of Shirilla, 89 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2004). 
 60.  Id. at 2. 
 61.  She had come to the U.S. on a “fiancée visa.”  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 3. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 4. 
 66.  Id. 
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live.67  The Montana Supreme Court found the negotiations coercive and upheld 
a finding of involuntariness.68 
In Kornegary v. Robinson,69 the parties became engaged in “early October” 
1990 and decided to marry October 12.70  On October 11, the man told the 
woman he wanted a premarital agreement.71  The day of the wedding, the parties 
went to the office of the husband’s lawyer to review the agreement that had been 
drafted.72  The woman was generally told that it limited her rights on divorce.73  
She signed it without reading it or consulting a lawyer.74  The marriage ended 
when the husband died.75  Contrary to what the wife was told, the agreement 
limited her rights regardless of whether the marriage ended by death or 
divorce.76  The trial court granted summary judgment on behalf of the husband’s 
estate that the agreement was voluntarily signed and enforceable.77  The court of 
appeals, however, noted that the wife had only a high school education and was 
unsophisticated.78  In addition, the agreement was presented at the last minute, 
the husband’s financial disclosure was incomplete, and the wife did not consult 
with counsel.79  The court of appeals concluded that material issues of fact 
existed regarding whether the agreement was voluntarily signed, so the 
summary judgment motion ruling was reversed.80 
A few other somewhat recent cases have declined to enforce an agreement 
presented at the last minute.  In one case, the agreement was presented on the 
wedding day and the parties signed it in the church parking lot immediately 
before the wedding.81  In another case, an agreement signed the day before the 
wedding was not enforced.82  A third court held that an agreement was 
involuntarily signed when it was presented and signed two days before the 
wedding; the court emphasized the disparity in the parties’ respective ages, 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id.  See also Azarova v. Schmitt, No. C-060090, 2007 WL 490908 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); A.E.S. 
v. S.N.S., No. CN01-07370, 2006 WL 2389314 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2006); Chaplain v. Chaplain, 682 S.E.2d 
108 (Va. Ct. App. 2009); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 69.  625 S.E.2d 805 (N.C. App. Ct. 2006), rev’d, 637 S.E.2d 516 (N.C. 2006). 
 70.  Kornegary, 625 S.E.2d at 806. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 807. 
 78.  Id. at 808–09. 
 79.  Id. at 809. 
 80.  Id. at 810. 
 81.  See Hoag v. Dick, 799 A.2d 391 (Me. 2002) (applying pre-UPAA case law to determine the 
agreement was unenforceable).  In Pember v. Shapiro, 794 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 2011), the North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed a finding of involuntary execution when the agreement was drafted and 
signed hours before the wedding. 
 82.  See Bakos v. Bakos, 950 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming a finding of 
undue influence).  See also In re Marriage of Tamraz, 2005 WL 1524199 at *5–6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
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sophistication, and bargaining power.83 
Washington has applied a more robust procedural standard for enforceable 
premarital agreements.  In re Marriage of Bernard84 involved a prenuptial 
agreement signed by a very rich man and a poor prospective bride.85  The man 
gave the woman the first draft of the agreement about two weeks before the 
wedding date.86  The woman met with a lawyer three days before the wedding, 
apparently to go over the draft she had been given.87  That evening, her lawyer 
received a substantially revised draft.88  The groom said he would call off the 
wedding if she did not sign.89  The woman’s lawyer said it was very difficult to 
contact his client in light of the many wedding details and guests she was 
dealing with.90  She signed the agreement the day before the wedding.91  The 
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the woman did 
not sign the agreement “voluntarily or intelligently.”92 
However, the above cases invalidating the premarital agreements seem to 
be exceptions; in many instances, such agreements presented at the last minute 
are found to be voluntarily signed.93  This result largely flows from how the issue 
is framed—the agreement is perceived to be voluntarily signed unless the 
proponent made an unlawful threat or the objecting party was forced to sign it.  
This is a difficult standard to satisfy.  For example, in Texas the UPAA has been 
in effect for more than two decades, and in no appellate case so far has a 
premarital agreement been considered involuntarily signed. 
One recent example of this approach is In re Estate of Smid.94  In that case, the 
husband was dying of cancer.95  During the week he eventually died, his son 
from a prior marriage became concerned about his father’s lack of estate 
planning, and he asked a lawyer to meet with his father.96  The lawyer met with 
the husband and his wife and discussed his recommendation.97  The lawyer 
prepared documents to transfer ownership of the husband’s property to a trust; 
included was a waiver by the wife of her statutory rights as a surviving spouse.98  
The lawyer delivered the documents to the parties’ home on January 29, 2003; he 
did not explain the documents to the wife, apparently due to the understanding 
 
 83.  See In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003). 
 84.  204 P.3d 907 (Wash. 2009). 
 85.  Id. at 909. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 910. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 913. 
 93.  See OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, supra note 47, at § 4.03[4] n.59. 
 94.  756 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 2008). 
 95.  Id. at 4. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
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he was representing the husband.99  The wife did not obtain legal advice before 
she signed the documents that day.100  Later that evening, her husband died.101  
Under South Dakota law, her waiver was not enforceable if involuntarily 
signed.102  The wife admitted she was not “physically forced” to sign.103  Because 
of this, and because the trial court found that her husband’s impending death did 
not interfere with her ability to understand and comprehend events, the court 
affirmed the finding of voluntary execution.104 
Likewise, in Brown v. Brown,105 the wealthy party gave the other a draft of 
the agreement a day before the wedding.106  That party tried to contact her 
lawyer a few times that day but could not reach the lawyer.107  She then signed 
the agreement.108  The court rejected the woman’s later claim that the 
presentation of the agreement the day before the wedding, when preparations 
for the wedding had already been made and out-of-town guests had already 
arrived, at a time when obtaining legal advice was hampered by time constraints, 
created a coercive atmosphere.109 
Similarly, in the case In re Estate of Ingmand,110 the groom asked his lawyer to 
prepare an agreement and, three days before the wedding, while telling his 
prospective bride they were going to get a marriage license, the man drove her to 
his lawyer’s office to review and sign the premarital agreement.111  The appellate 
court affirmed the determination by the trial court that the agreement was valid, 
noting that: 
For [the male] to somehow trick [the female] into going to [the lawyer’s] office 
just days before their marriage, and then condition the marriage on her 
signature, was certainly not laudatory.  However, while these actions may be 
fairly characterized as surprise pressure tactics, they do not negate the knowing 
and voluntary nature of the execution.112 
Even if both parties have a lawyer, if a contract is presented at the last 
minute the negotiations can be quite confusing and frantically conducted due to 
the time pressure.  For example, in the case In re Marriage of Murphy,113 the first 
 
 99.  He apparently did discuss his general recommendations in the initial meeting.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 5. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 7. 
 104.  Id. at 14. 
 105.  26 So.3d 1210 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2007). 
 106.  Id. at 1212. 
 107.  On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that the agreement contained a recital that 
she had consulted with independent counsel before signing, so the trial court could reasonably 
disbelieve the woman’s contention that she was not able to get legal advice.  See 26 So.2d 1222 (Ala. 
2009). 
 108.  Brown, 26 So.3d at 1212. 
 109.  Id. at 1215. 
 110.  No. 08-1281, 2001 WL 855406 (Iowa App. Ct. July 31, 2001). 
 111.  Id. at *1. 
 112.  Id. at *3. 
 113.  834 N.E.2d 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
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draft (written by the groom’s lawyer) was exchanged two days before the 
wedding.114  The woman then contacted her lawyer and asked him to draft an 
alternate agreement.115  Her lawyer advised her not to sign the initial draft 
prepared by the man’s lawyer.116  On the day of the wedding, the man and 
woman (but not her lawyer) went to the office of the man’s lawyer to discuss 
changes to the draft his lawyer had prepared.117  After discussing some revisions, 
the man gave her a copy of a revised agreement three hours before the wedding 
was to begin.118  Without having her lawyer review the revised agreement, she 
signed it.119  The appellate court affirmed the finding of the trial court that, while 
the circumstances surrounding execution were certainly stressful, it was unlikely 
a product of coercion or duress.120 
In another case, weeks before the planned wedding, the groom said he 
wanted the parties to sign a premarital agreement, and the woman said she 
would consider one.121  The evening before the parties were to go to Las Vegas to 
be married on New Year’s Eve, the man gave the woman a draft of a premarital 
agreement and stated he would marry only if she signed.122  The trial court found 
that the woman had no time to discuss the agreement with a lawyer or anyone 
else due to the time the draft was first presented, so the trial court invalidated the 
agreement based on undue influence and duress.123  Although the court of 
appeals acknowledged the confidential relationship of people who are about to 
marry, it held that “[t]he mere shortness of the time . . . between the presentation 
of the premarital agreement and the date of the wedding is insufficient alone to 
permit a finding of duress or undue influence;” further, “the shortness of the 
time interval when combined with a threat to call off the marriage if the 
agreement is not executed is likewise insufficient . . . to invalidate the 
agreement.”124  Although the wife received the first draft of the agreement at 8:00 
PM on December 30, with a planned wedding the next evening a substantial 
distance away, the appellate court concluded that, “we cannot presume . . . that 
the wife had insufficient time to . . . [consult] an attorney.”125 
In DeLorean v. DeLorean,126 the court considered whether to enforce an 
agreement presented by the husband “a few hours” before the wedding where 
he stated that he would cancel the wedding if the prospective bride did not 
sign.127  The agreement provided that all income and earnings of the parties 
 
 114.  Id. at 59. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 59–60. 
 119.  Id. at 60. 
 120.  Id. at 67. 
 121.  Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d 610, 612 (N.C. Ct. App.1989). 
 122.   Id. at 612. 
 123.  Id. at 614. 
 124.  Id. at 617. 
 125.  Id. at 618. 
 126.  511 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986). 
 127.  Id. at 1259. 
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acquired before or during marriage would be exempt from equitable distribution 
if the parties divorced.128  The woman did consult with a lawyer who had been 
selected by the prospective husband to counsel her; the lawyer advised her not to 
sign.129  After some period of indecision, the wife did sign the agreement before 
the wedding.130  The court held that the agreement was voluntarily signed, 
noting that the wife “had sufficient time to consider the consequences of signing 
the agreement.”131 
In another case, the party being asked to waive rights was given the 
agreement two days before it was to be signed.132  She argued that was 
overreaching.133  The appellate court stated that “two days . . . provided her 
ample opportunity to seek the advice of counsel before signing,” and it affirmed 
the ruling that the agreement should be enforced.134 
Pajak v. Pajak135 also involved an agreement presented by a sophisticated 
party to an unsophisticated party a day before the wedding.136  The court upheld 
the agreement.137 
Other courts have concluded that, despite the agreement being presented at 
the last minute, the other party was not coerced into signing, so the agreement 
was voluntarily signed.138  Some courts have sensibly considered whether, 
despite the agreement being signed shortly before the wedding, the parties had 
agreed to the material terms substantially earlier.139  However, if the parties have 
only vaguely agreed to sign a premarital agreement without much clarity 
regarding the precise terms of the agreement, it seems unfair to treat such an 
agreement differently from any other agreement presented and negotiated 
shortly before the wedding.140 
ii. Duress 
Many non-UPAA states will not enforce an agreement if “duress” is found 
in connection with the negotiation and execution of the agreement.  Duress is 
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id.. 
 132.  Wiethe v. Beaty, No. CA98-04-049, 1999 WL 74595 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1999). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  385 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1989). 
 136.  Id. at 385. 
 137.  Id. at 389. 
 138.  See Panossian v. Panossian, 172 A.D.2d 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (considering an agreement 
signed two days before the wedding).  Other cases have enforced agreements signed shortly before 
the wedding.  See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990); Estate of Cooper, 2011 WL 
244 8979 (Miss. App.); Mann v. Mann,  2010 WL 1266677 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.  Apr. 5, 2010). 
 139.  See Lee v. Lee, 816 S.W.2d 625, 627–28 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991). 
 140.  Cf. Donovan v. Donovan, No. 159622, 1999 WL 1499141 (Va. Cir. Ct.) (making the 
questionable argument that the objecting party was aware of the “basic parameters” of the agreement 
to be presented). 
Oldham_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:20 AM 
 A REEVALUATION OF THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT 97 
 
customarily defined as “improper and coercive conduct”141 that “destroys the 
free agency of a party.”142  The case law regarding whether there was duress 
sufficient to invalidate an agreement is similar to cases discussed above 
involving whether an agreement was “voluntarily” signed. 
Some courts have found duress in fairly extreme situations.  For example, in 
Holler v. Holler,143 the prospective wife moved from the Ukraine to marry a man 
in South Carolina.144  She had a visa that would expire in three months unless she 
married.145  A month after her arrival she became pregnant by her intended 
husband.146  The  groom then gave her a draft of a premarital agreement, which 
was hard for her to understand because her English was not good.147  She did not 
obtain legal advice before signing the document; they married shortly thereafter, 
three days before her visa expired.148  She could remain in the U.S. only if she 
married a U.S. citizen.149  Because the wife did not understand the agreement, 
was pregnant, and did not want to return to the Ukraine, the court affirmed the 
trial court’s finding of duress.150 
Similarly, in Hjortaas v. McCabe,151 the man told the woman weeks before the 
wedding that he wanted a premarital agreement.152  He provided a draft of an 
agreement two or three days before the wedding, and the agreement was signed 
the day before the wedding.153  No financial disclosure was exchanged.154  The 
appellate court concluded that, because she only had “one day to seek 
counsel . . . , to make an independent evaluation of the contract, or to cancel the 
wedding,” her signature was the product of “unwarranted compulsion” and the 
agreement should not be enforced.155 
When an agreement waiving rights is presented at the last minute to a party 
and that person is told that he or she has to sign it or the wedding will be 
cancelled, the person waiving rights frequently contends that there was 
substantial pressure to sign the agreement due to the presence of numerous 
guests and family members and the embarrassment and expense that would 
result from canceling the wedding.  When considering the issue of duress, 
although some courts have stated that this concern would be taken seriously if it 
 
 141.  Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522, 524–25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 142.  Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469, 474 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). See Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d 
610, 616 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); Schrage v. Schrage, No. 2008-CA-002088-MR, 2009 WL 4882819 (Ky. Ct. 
App.); Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732, 745 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 143.  612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 144.  Id. at 471. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 476. 
 151.  656 So.2d 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
 152.  Id. at 169. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 170. 
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is a large wedding with many guests,156 most courts have ruled that, regardless 
of whether it would have been difficult or embarrassing to cancel, the party 
chose not to do so and was not forced to sign the agreement.157 
When analyzing whether duress occurred when an agreement is signed 
shortly before the wedding, some courts in non-UPAA states distinguish 
between situations where the parties were negotiating the agreement for a 
substantial period and those where the agreement is presented at the last 
minute.158 
A number of courts have found no duress when the agreement was 
presented a day or two before the wedding.159  For example, in the case In re 
Marriage of Yannalfo,160 the man presented the woman with a draft agreement one 
day before the wedding and told her he would not marry unless she signed the 
agreement.161  In their later divorce, the trial court invalidated the agreement 
based on duress.162  The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the presentation of an agreement one day before the wedding is “insufficient to 
support a finding of duress.”163 
Likewise, in Fletcher v. Fletcher,164 the court affirmed a trial court finding of 
no duress when the agreement was presented the day before the wedding.165  
Similarly, in Williams v. Williams,166 the court affirmed a finding by the trial court 
that there was no duress when a premarital agreement was presented and signed 
a day before the wedding.167 
 
 156.  Compare In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 350, 353 (N.H. 2003) (emphasizing the large 
wedding as one factor justifying the ruling that the agreement was involuntarily signed), with 
Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting the couple planned to 
marry at the courthouse and that the wedding could have easily been postponed), Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1347 (Ohio 1994) (noting that the wedding could have been relatively easily 
been postponed), In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 820 (Cal. 2000) (noting the wedding could have 
easily been postponed), and Millstein v. Millstein, No. 80963,2002 WL 31031676 *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Sept. 12, 2002) (noting the wedding could have easily been postponed). 
 157.  See Brown v. Brown, 26 So.3d 1210, 1217 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2007); DeLorean v. DeLorean, 
511 A.2d 1257, 1259 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986). 
 158.  See Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (containing a long 
negotiation period); Boote v. Shivers, 198 S.W.3d 732 (Tenn. App. 2005) (containing a long negotiation 
period); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990) (finding that the agreement had been negotiated 
for a long period). 
 159.  See Ware v. Ware, 7 So.3d 271, 276–77 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the waiving party 
was not forced to sign the agreement presented two days before the wedding); Brown v. Brown, 26 
So.3d 1210, 1217 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2007) (emphasizing the objecting party was a real estate agent 
with experience negotiating contracts); Howell v. Landry, 386 S.E.2d 610, 614–15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) 
(finding that the objecting party “was not compelled by financial or other considerations to marry the 
next day”); Hood v. Hood, 72 So.3d 666 (Ala. App. 2011). 
 160.  In re Marriage of Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795 (N.H. 2002). 
 161.  Id. at 796. 
 162.  Id. at 797. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994). 
 165.  Id. at 1348.  The court concluded the wedding date could easily have been postponed.  Id. at 
1347. 
 166.  720 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1986). 
 167.  The court emphasized that the waiving party had experience with contracts in her job.  Id. at 
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As stated above, there is a split of authority regarding whether presenting 
an agreement a day or two before the wedding is duress.168  In contrast, 
agreements presented more than a few days before the wedding are almost 
always considered to have been negotiated without duress.169  An exception is 
Eyster v. Pechenik,170 where the court stated that an agreement signed five days 
before the wedding “raised questions” of duress.171 
Regardless of whether the court is applying a standard of “involuntariness” 
or “duress,” most courts have not found duress if a woman is pregnant and the 
man offers to marry her only if she signs a premarital agreement.172 
ii. Summary 
The discussion above shows that, regardless of whether a state applies a 
standard of involuntariness, duress, overreaching, coercion, or undue influence, 
a significant number of courts have enforced premarital agreements proposed at 
the last minute. 
B. Disclosure of Financial Information 
Under the UPAA, it is only relevant whether the waiving party received 
adequate information from the other if the waiving party can also establish the 
agreement was unconscionable when signed.173  Some “adopting” states 
modified this provision to be consistent with the approach applied in almost all 
 
248. 
 168.  Compare Hjortaas v. McCabe, 656 So.2d 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), with In re Marriage of 
Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795 (N.H. 2002), Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994) and Williams v. 
Williams, 720 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1986). 
 169.  See, e.g., Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522, 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that 
the agreement was signed one hour before the ceremony, but the parties had been negotiating “for 
months” and the waiving party had a lawyer); Millstein v. Millstein, No. 80963, 2002 WL 31031676 at 
*7–8 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2012) (finding that eight days were sufficient); Gordon v. Gordon, 25 
So.3d 615, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that ten days were sufficient); McKee-Johnson v. 
Johnson, 444 N.W.2d at 262 (finding that ten days were sufficient). 
 170.  887 N.E.2d 272 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008). 
 171.  Id. at 282. 
 172.  See Biliouris v. Biliouris, 852 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (finding no duress); 
Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding no duress); In re Marriage 
of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976) (finding no undue influence); Herrera v. Herrera, 895 So.2d 1171 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding no duress); Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. 2005) (finding no 
duress); Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. App. 2002) (finding the agreement was voluntarily 
signed); Kilborn v. Kilborn, 628 So.2d 884 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (finding the agreement was 
voluntary).  But see Rowland v. Rowland, 599 N.E.2d 315 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Bassler v. Bassler, 593 
A.2d 82 (Vt. 1991).  In this regard, courts apparently have been more enthusiastic about enforcing 
agreements than the drafting committee intended.  When the UPAA was being debated, it was 
suggested that an agreement would not be enforced under the UPAA if a young pregnant girl was 
asked to sign a one-sided agreement as a condition of marriage.  See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, PROCEEDINGS IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, UNIFORM 
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT 71–72 (1983). 
 173.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, §6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001).  See Chaplain v. 
Chaplain, 682 S.E.2d 108, 115 (Va. App. 2009) (finding that the challenging party was able to establish 
both elements, which is rare in cases). 
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other states, namely that insufficient knowledge of the other’s financial condition 
at the time of signing should be an independent ground for invalidating an 
agreement.174  For instance, in Minnesota premarital agreements are to be 
enforced only if there was “full and fair disclosure of the earnings and property” 
of each party.175 
In most UPAA states, the disclosure requirement is satisfied by: (i) 
disclosure, (ii) the party being aware of the information by other means, or (iii) a 
waiver of the right to disclosure.  Some states do not mention all three of these 
ways of satisfying the requirement.  For example, the Minnesota, Virginia, and 
Connecticut statutes require disclosure.176  The Wisconsin and Iowa statutes do 
not mention that the right to disclosure can be waived.177 
There is widespread disagreement among states regarding the amount of 
information needed to satisfy the disclosure requirement.  For example, in 
DeLorean v. DeLorean, the waiving party had extremely general knowledge of her 
prospective husband’s finances.178  The agreement provided that the “[h]usband 
is the owner of substantial real and personal property and he has reasonable 
prospects of earning large sums of monies.”179  The wife apparently knew that 
the husband had an interest in a farm in California, a large tract of land in 
Montana, and a share of a major league baseball team.180  The court concluded 
that this level of disclosure satisfied what it found to be the less demanding 
standard applicable in California, but that it did not meet the more rigorous New 
Jersey standard.181 
As the DeLorean court noted, states are applying different standards 
regarding financial disclosure requirements for premarital agreements.182  Most 
states seem to agree that a precise disclosure of the value of all property is not 
needed; a general and approximate knowledge appears sufficient.183  But what 
does this mean in practice?  In one case,184 the wealthy party did not disclose his 
income.185  Was this material?  The court held that it was not, at least in part 
because the woman knew he was wealthy with significant income-producing 
assets, and she had lived with him for four years before the agreement was 
 
 174.  See supra Part II. B. iv. 
 175.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.11 (West 2006). 
 176.  See id.; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46(b)–36(g) (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-151 (2008). 
 177.  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 596.8 (West 2011). 
 178.  511 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986). 
 179.  Id. at 1260. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  The court enforced the agreement because it found California law should govern.  Id. 
 182.  See id. 
 183.  See Robinson v. Robinson, 64 So.3d 1067 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010); Gordon v. Gordon, 25 So.3d 
615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Brown v. Brown, 26 So.3d 1210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007); In re Estate of 
Davis, 213 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Cannon v. Cannon, 865 A.2d 563 (Md. 2005); Millstein v. 
Millstein, No. 80963, 2002 WL 310311676 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2002); Griffin v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 96 
(Okla. Civ. App. 2004); Marriage of Spiegel, 553 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996). 
 184.   Dove v. Dove, 680 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. 2009). 
 185.  Id. at 843. 
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signed.186  In Corbett v. Corbett,187 the same court held that, where the agreement 
contained an alimony waiver and the objecting party was not otherwise aware of 
the man’s income, the wealthy person’s nondisclosure of his income was 
grounds for invalidating the agreement.188  In other cases, the  nondisclosure of 
significant premarital savings was sufficient to invalidate the agreement.189 
Other cases consider whether it is sufficient that the objecting party knew 
what the other party owned or whether an approximate value also needs to be 
provided.  The court in Gordon v. Gordon190 held that omitting the husband’s 
rights to a pension plan from his disclosure statement did not invalidate the 
agreement where the woman had a “general and approximate” knowledge of the 
husband’s resources.191  In a North Dakota case, it was considered sufficient that 
the waiving party knew her prospective husband “was worth a substantial 
amount of money.”192  One court has concluded that, when parties marry early in 
their adult life with few assets, a lack of disclosure of financial information 
should not be grounds for invalidating an agreement.193  A number of courts 
have held that the waiving party has adequate familiarity with the other party’s 
financial situation if they dated a substantial period of time before the wedding 
and thereby became knowledgeable of the other’s standard of living and 
spending habits.194  In cases where the assets were identified but no values were 
set forth, it could be important whether the assets would be easy to value (such 
as publicly traded stocks) or the objecting party was familiar with the assets.195 
Some states, including Tennessee, appear to require more detailed 
disclosures.196  In In re Estate of Davis,197 the husband was aware when he signed 
the agreement that the wife had a contract with a recording company and that 
 
 186.  See id.  See also Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 816 (Ga. 2005) (finding that the woman had 
an awareness of the man’s “significant income.”); Smith v. Walsh-Smith, 66 A.D.3d 534, 535 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2009) (finding disclosure of the wealthy party’s income was not needed where the other 
party was fully aware of the financial disparity between the two parties); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 687 
S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ga. 2009) (finding disclosure of the wealthy party’s income was not needed where 
the other party was fully aware of the financial disparity between the two parties). 
 187.  628 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. 2006). 
 188.  See id.  Other courts have held the disclosure incomplete when the party’s income was not 
disclosed. See Casto v. Casto, 508 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1987); Stemler v. Stemler, 36 So.3d 54 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2009) (applying Florida law). 
 189.  See Alexander v. Alexander, 610 S.E.2d 48, 49–50 (Ga. 2005) (noting a $40,000 account); Blige 
v. Blige, 656 S.E.2d 822, 825–26 (Ga. 2008) (noting $150,000 in hidden cash). 
 190.  25 So.3d 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 191.  Id. at 618. 
 192.  Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 599 (N.D. 2004).  See also, Brown v. Brown, 26 So.3d 1210 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (finding waiving spouse was aware the other party “was a millionaire”). 
 193.  See Reed v. Reed, 693 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 194.  See Winchester v. McCue, 882 A.2d 143, 147–48 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (noting that the 
waiving party was a lawyer who was represented by independent counsel.); Donovan v. Donovan, 
No. 159622, 1999 WL 1499141 at *5 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 1999) (noting that the waiving party helped 
the other maintain records of his various businesses). 
 195.  See In re Estate of Reinsmidt, 897 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 687 
S.E.2d 421 (Ga. 2009). 
 196.  See In re Estate of Davis, 213 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 197.  213 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
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she owned some other property.198  The value of the properties was not 
disclosed, and the court found that he was not otherwise aware of their value.199  
Because the husband was not aware of the value of her properties, the agreement 
was not enforced.200 
In these types of cases in Tennessee, it may become determinative whether 
the objecting spouse had independent counsel.  In Reece v. Elliott,201 the issue was 
similar to that presented in In re Estate of Davis.202  The disclosure document 
listed various assets but did not list approximate values for all.203  The appellate 
court affirmed the finding that the disclosure was adequate, noting that the 
objecting party was represented by counsel and that she and her lawyer had the 
opportunity to  ask questions about the financial disclosure document.204 
New Jersey also requires more detailed disclosure.205  The waiving party 
must have “full awareness” of the income and assets of the other.206  In one case, 
while the objecting party was aware that the other was a man of some wealth, 
she had no idea what his net worth was when the agreement was signed, and the 
agreement was not enforced.207  In Estate of Shinn208 the appellate court 
invalidated the agreement when it found the proponent of the agreement failed 
to disclose important assets.209 
If disclosure is not made, the agreement will generally not be enforced210 
unless the objecting party already was aware of the financial information.  Also, 
if the wealthy party materially misrepresents his net worth, this has been held to 
be inadequate disclosure.  For example, in one case, an agreement was 
invalidated where a party represented in a premarital agreement that his net 
worth was $473,000 but had a few months earlier in a loan application stated his 
net worth was $1,341,000.211 
If a party does attempt to place values on items of property, this presents 
the issue of how accurate the values need to be.  In one case, the wealthy party 
disclosed that he had an ownership interest in a small business and listed the 
value as about $2,000,000.212  A footnote stated this was the “book value” of the 
stock and that the market value could be substantially higher.213  The court 
 
 198.  Id. at 293–94. 
 199.  Id. at 297–98. 
 200.  Id. at 298. 
 201.  208 S.W.3d 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 202.  See 213 S.W.3d 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). 
 203.  Reece, 208 S.W.3d at 420. 
 204.  Id. at 423. 
 205.  See Marschall v. Marschall, 477 A.2d 833, 840 ( N.J. Super. Ct. 1984). 
 206.  See id. 
 207.  See Orgler v. Orgler, 568 A.2d 67 (N.J. 1989) (invalidating the agreement even though the 
objecting party met briefly with a lawyer). 
 208.  925 A.2d 88 (N.J. App. Div. 2007). 
 209.  Id. at 91. 
 210.  See In re Marriage of Seewald, 22 P.3d 580, 585 (Colo. App. 2001). 
 211.  See Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 644 N.W.2d 197 (N.D. 2002). 
 212.  Gardner v. Gardner, 527 N.W.2d 701, 705–06 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
 213.  Id. at 705. 
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rejected the waiving party’s later argument that providing book value and not 
market value was misleading, at least in part because the waiving party had a 
lawyer (who presumably could have requested more detailed financial 
information).214 
C. Independent Counsel 
Although in many states it is important that parties have an opportunity to 
consult with independent counsel if they so choose, in no state is consultation 
with independent counsel a requirement for an enforceable premarital 
agreement.215  The presence of independent counsel is a factor courts consider 
when deciding questions of voluntary execution or the adequacy of financial 
disclosure.216  The West Virginia Supreme Court recently announced that a 
premarital agreement will be presumed valid only if both parties consulted with 
independent counsel.217  In California, a restriction on spousal support is 
permissible only if the waiving party consulted with independent counsel.218 
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS 
Premarital agreements contemplating divorce normally attempt to alter the 
economic rights of the parties if they divorce.  Some limit the rights of the less 
wealthy spouse but still provide significant financial recovery to that spouse if 
the marriage ends in divorce.219  But many severely restrict or attempt to 
completely eliminate all financial claims upon divorce.220 
States disagree regarding the extent to which the substantive fairness of an 
agreement should impact its enforceability.  Under the UPAA, substantive 
fairness is relevant only if there is also inadequate financial disclosure.221  In 
many non-UPAA states, an agreement may be challenged based upon unfairness 
 
 214.  Id. at 706. 
 215.  See Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594 (N.D. 2004); Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 644 N.W.2d 197 
(N.D. 2002); In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (2000); In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506 
(Iowa 2008); Mabus v. Mabus, 890 So.2d 806 (Miss. 2003); Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 
1990); Donovan v. Donovan, No. 159622,  1999 WL 1499141 (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 1999); Panossian v. 
Panossian, 172 A.D.2d 811 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.3d 90 (N.D. 1997); 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994); In re Estate of Kinney, 733 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 2007); 
Brown v. Brown, 26 So.3d 1210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).  See generally OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, 
supra note 47, at § 4.03[5] nn.96, 99, & 104.. 
 216.  See, e.g., Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996); In re Estate of Smid, 756 
N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 2008); In re Estate of Lutz, 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 
1343 (Ohio 1994); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005); Edwards v. Edwards, 744 
N.W.2d 243 (Neb. 2008); In re Estate of Kinney, 733 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 2007); Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 
929 N.E.2d 955, 963 n.9 (Mass. 2010).  See generally OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, supra note 47, at § 
4.03[5], n.97. 
 217.  See Ware v. Ware, 687 S.E.2d 382, 390–91 (W.Va. 2009). 
 218.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2004). 
 219.  See Jamie Doward, Divorce Deals: Wealthy, Young British Men Turn to Prenups, THE OBSERVER, 
July 18, 2010 (describing the premarital agreement between Tom Cruise and Katie Holmes). 
 220.  See id. 
 221.  See supra Part II. B. iv.  See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code §  4.006(a)(2). 
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alone.222  Some states evaluate fairness at the time of signing and some at the 
time of enforcement.223  A few consider whether the agreement is fair;224 most 
consider whether it is unconscionable.225  Others ask whether the parties’ 
circumstances have changed in an unforeseeable way during the marriage.226 
A. Unconscionability 
In some states that adopted the bulk of the UPAA, an agreement can be 
challenged solely based on the unconscionability of the agreement.  In 
Wisconsin, Indiana, and Nevada, the focus is on unconscionability at time of 
signing.227  Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Dakota consider 
unconscionability at the time of enforcement.228  Other non-UPAA courts also 
review for unconscionability at the time of divorce.229 
Few statutes define what constitutes an unconscionable agreement.  The 
New Jersey statute provides that an agreement is unconscionable if it leaves a 
party without a means of reasonable support or would provide a standard of 
living for a party far below what the party enjoyed before the marriage.230 
In states without statutory definitions, courts must clarify the characteristics 
of an unconscionable agreement.  A few courts have stated that an 
unconscionable agreement is one that is not “fair, reasonable and just.”231  Most 
courts require a more substantial showing to find an agreement unconscionable.  
One court noted that review of an agreement for unconscionability “is 
substantially more circumscribed than review for mere inequity,”232 and courts 
are to examine factors of “unfair surprise, notice, disparity of bargaining power, 
and substantive unfairness.”233  Another court suggested that the primary focus 
should be whether there was unfair surprise and the extent to which the 
agreement is one-sided.234  Another perspective is that ”[u]nconscionability is the 
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one party due to one-sided contract 
provisions, together with terms which are so oppressive that no reasonable 
person would make [these provisions].”235  Other courts have characterized an 
 
 222.  See OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION supra note 47, at  §  4.03[3]. 
 223.  See supra Part II. B. i. 
 224.  See DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (stating an agreement must be “fair 
and reasonable” when signed). 
 225.  See infra Part IV. A. 
 226.  See id. 
 227.  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.58(6) (West 2009); IND. CODE 31-11-3-8 (LexisNexis 2007); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 123 A.080(1) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 228.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-36g (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-37 (West 2011); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2009). 
 229.  See Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 
797 (Mass. 2002) (stating that an agreement must also be “fair and reasonable” when signed). 
 230.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-32. 
 231.  See In re Marriage of Christen, 899 P.2d 339, 343 (Colo. App. 1995). 
 232.  In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 514–15 (Iowa 2008). 
 233.   Id. 
 234.  See Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988). 
 235.  See Holler v. Holler 612 S.E.2d 469, 476 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).  See also Chaplain v. Chaplain, 
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unconscionable agreement as one where the inequity is “strong, gross and 
manifest,”236 the terms are “manifestly unfair and unreasonable,”237 or 
enforcement of the agreement would “work an injustice.”238 
But what do these terms mean in practice?  In Gentry v. Gentry,239 the court 
held that the agreement should not be enforced if a party would thereby be 
unable to be self-supporting after divorce.240  Other courts have held that an 
agreement should not be enforced if a party would become a public charge.241  A 
third view is that the relevant inquiry looks to whether the parties’ circumstances 
have changed in an unforeseeable way since the wedding.242  One court held an 
agreement to be unconscionable where the waiving party had no assets and no 
income.243 
For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a postnuptial 
agreement should not be enforced if it would be unconscionable at divorce to do 
so.  In Bedrick v. Bedrick,244 the parties signed a postnuptial agreement in 1977 and 
amended it in 1989.245 The amended agreement limited the wife’s claims at 
divorce to a payment of $75,000.246  In 2007, the wife filed for divorce.247  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the agreement 
should not be enforced because doing so would work an injustice.248  The 
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that “[u]nforeseen changes in the relationship, 
such as having a child, loss of employment or moving to another state, may 
render enforcement of an agreement unconscionable.”249  In this case, after the 
agreement had been amended, the wife gave birth to a child and the husband’s 
financial situation changed significantly.250 
An alternative standard for reviewing a premarital agreement is that an 
agreement should not be enforced if it would leave either party with a standard 
of living far below that enjoyed before or during marriage.251  Another suggested 
standard is that an agreement is not unconscionable at divorce if it does not 
attempt to restrict spousal support.252  In evaluating the conscionability of an 
 
682 S.E.2d 108, 113 (Va. Ct. App. 2009). 
 236.  McMullin v. McMullin, 926 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). 
 237.  Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001). 
 238.  See Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 28 (Conn. 2011). 
 239.  789 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990). 
 240.  See id. at 937 (Ky. 1990).  See also Justus v. Justus, 581 N.E.2d 1265, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
 241.  See Bassler v. Bassler, 593 A.2d 82 (Vt. 1991); Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 
1981); McFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d 585 (N.H. 1989). 
 242.  See Blue, 60 S.W.3d at 589–90; Lane v. Lane, 202 S.W.3d 577, 578 (Ky. 2006). 
 243.  Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. 2005). 
 244.  Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 22 (Conn. 2011). 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Id. at 21–22. 
 248.  Id. at 29. 
 249.  Id. at 28. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  See Marschall v. Marschall, 477 A.2d 833, 840–41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984). 
 252.  See Binek v. Binek, 673 N.W.2d 594, 600 (N.D. 2004). 
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agreement, some courts have considered whether the party waives all rights to 
the possibility of a divisible marital estate.253 
The terms of the agreement, the age of the parties, and their respective roles 
during the marriage also can be relevant in determining unconscionability.  In 
Lane v. Lane,254 the court emphasized that the agreement involved both a waiver 
of the right to divide a marital estate at divorce as well as the right to post-
divorce maintenance.255  This court also suggested that agreements between 
spouses marrying later in life were more likely to be upheld than agreements 
between younger parties who had children together.256 
Courts are not limited to choosing between fully enforcing or invalidating 
an agreement.  They might choose to enforce a portion and invalidate a portion.  
In Lane, for example, both parties waived their rights to equitable distribution as 
well as their rights to maintenance.257  During marriage, the husband’s career 
prospered and the wife stayed home to take care of their young children.258  After 
ten years of marriage, the husband filed for divorce.259  The trial court enforced 
the waiver of equitable distribution but found that enforcement of the 
maintenance waiver would be unconscionable, ordering the husband to pay 
$12,000 monthly for three years.260  The Kentucky Supreme Court held that a 
court may decide not to enforce some or all of a premarital agreement when at 
the time of divorce circumstances had changed since the agreement was signed 
so as to make enforcement unfair and unreasonable.261  The husband’s annual 
earnings had increased during marriage from $166,000 to $1,000,000.262  The 
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding that the waiver of the 
right to equitable distribution should be enforced but the waiver of maintenance 
should not.263  Similarly, a number of courts have proposed that waivers of the 
right to equitable distribution should be presumptively valid, but if there is also 
a waiver of spousal support the court should more aggressively review whether 
the enforcement of a waiver of the right to support would be unfair.264 
Likewise, in a recent New Jersey case, Rogers v. Gordon,265 the parties 
 
 253.  See Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); In re Marriage of Thomas, 199 
S.W.3d 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). 
 254.  202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006). 
 255.  Id. at 579–80. 
 256.  Id. at 580. 
 257.  Id. at 578. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  Id. at 579. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. at 581. 
 264.  See Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 
1982).  Lewis has been superseded by statute.  In In re Marriage of Dechant, the court construed COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 14-2-307 (2011) as a codification of the Newman approach.  867 P.2d 193 (Colo. App. 
1993), 
 265.  961 A.2d 11 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2008). 
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married at a relatively young age with few assets.266  However, different career 
trajectories seemed quite likely.  The husband worked for the postal service 
while the wife had graduated from Princeton and was planning to pursue an 
MBA at the Wharton School.267  Their premarital agreement apparently included 
waivers of the right to equitable distribution and the right to support.268  After a 
twenty-four-year marriage, the wife was earning $578,000 annually and the 
husband’s annual income of $63,000 seemed likely to decrease in the future.269  
The appellate court enforced the waiver of a right to equitable distribution but 
would permit spousal support if the husband would otherwise have a standard 
of living lower than that enjoyed during marriage.270 
Other courts have agreed that changes in the parties’ circumstances during 
marriage should be more relevant to restrictions on spousal support than 
waivers relating to equitable distribution.271  For example, the Colorado Supreme 
Court proposed that, while equitable distribution waivers should not be subject 
to a fairness review, a restriction on the right to spousal support could be 
unconscionable and should not be enforced if it would leave a party after divorce 
“without a means of reasonable support.”272  The Hawaii Supreme Court 
proposed a similar approach.273 
This approach was also applied in Gross v. Gross274 where the parties signed 
a premarital agreement which waived the right to equitable distribution and 
provided that, in the event of a divorce, the husband would pay the wife 
monthly spousal support of $200 for ten years.275  The parties divorced twelve 
years later when the husband’s net worth had quite substantially increased to 
$6,000,000 and his income had also significantly increased.276  The court adopted 
an approach similar to that applied by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Newman277: a waiver of the right to property division should not be subject to a 
substantive fairness review, but a restriction on the right to spousal support can 
become unconscionable if circumstances of the parties have significantly changed 
during marriage.278  Here the court ruled that, in light of the substantial increase 
in the husband’s wealth during marriage, it would be unconscionable to enforce 
the maintenance restriction.279 
 
 266.  See id. at 13. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Id. at 20. 
 269.  Id. at 14. 
 270.  Id. at 21. 
 271.  See Lewis v. Lewis, 748 P.2d 1362 (Haw. 1988); Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 
1982). 
 272.  Newman, 653 P.2d at 736. 
 273.  Lewis, 748 P.2d at 1366–67. 
 274.  464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984). 
 275.  Id. at 503. 
 276.  Id. 
 277.  See Newman, 653 P.2d 728. 
 278.  Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 509. 
 279.  On remand, the wife was awarded monthly support in the amount of $2,500 for an 
indefinite period.  Gross, 492 N.E.2d 476 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).  For an Ohio case finding an alimony 
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B. Substantial and Unforeseen Change in Circumstances 
In reviewing the fairness of an agreement at divorce, some courts have 
decided that an agreement should not be enforced if the circumstances of the 
parties changed during marriage in ways that were beyond the contemplation of 
the parties when they married.280  In one case, the waiving party suffered years of 
domestic violence during the marriage and the husband insisted she quit her job; 
this was found to be an unforeseen change in circumstances.281  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court has suggested that an unforeseen health problem or an 
unplanned pregnancy could be an unforeseen change in circumstances that 
would justify not enforcing the agreement.282  In many instances, however, the 
change in the parties’ circumstances has been perceived to be foreseeable. 
For example, in Winchester v. McCue,283 the parties filed for divorce after 
fifteen years of marriage.284  Their premarital agreement apparently barred the 
division of marital property or the award of spousal support.285  The husband’s 
net worth was $1,223,000 when the marriage began and increased by more than 
400% during marriage.286  The court found that this was not an “extraordinary 
change in economic status” that was “so far beyond the contemplation of the 
parties . . . as to make enforcement of the agreement work an injustice.”287 
A similar outcome was reached in Crews v. Crews288 where the parties 
divorced after seventeen years of marriage.289  The parties had raised children 
together.290  The wife had been in a car accident, which limited her mobility.291  
The premarital agreement apparently banned both equitable distribution of 
property as well as the right to spousal support.292  The trial court concluded 
that, because the value of the husband’s assets had greatly increased during 
marriage and in light of the length of the marriage and the wife’s homemaking 
contributions, the agreement should not be enforced.293  On appeal, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court noted the approach taken in Winchester v. McCue 
that an agreement should be considered unenforceable only upon a showing of 
 
waiver not unconscionable, see Mann v. Mann, No. 09CA009685, 2010 WL 1266688 at *4 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Apr. 5, 2010). 
 280.  See, e.g., MacFarlane v. Rich, 567 A.2d 585 (N.H. 1989).  See also Reed v. Reed, 265 Mich. App. 
131, 693 N.W.2d 825 (2005); Mazzitelli v. Mazzitelli, 2005 WL 221683 (Minn. App.); Warren v. Warren, 
147 Wis.2d 704, 433 N.W.2d 295 (1988); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985). 
 281.  See Hutchison v. Hutchison, No. 284259, 2009 WL 2244522 at *3–4 (Mich. Ct. App. July 28, 
2009). 
 282.  See Warren v. Warren, 433 N.W.2d 295 (Wis. 1988). 
 283.  882 A.2d 143 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). 
 284.  Id. at 146. 
 285.  Id. at 145. 
 286.  Id. at 145, 149. 
 287.  Id. at 149 (quoting McHugh v. McHugh, 436 A.2d 8, 12 (Conn. 1980)). 
 288.  989 A.2d 1060 (Conn. 2010). 
 289.  Id. at 1062–63. 
 290.  Id. at 1062. 
 291.  Id. at 1063. 
 292.  Id. at 1067–68. 
 293.  Id. at 1070. 
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an “extraordinary change in economic status.”294  The Supreme Court affirmed 
the appellate court’s ruling that the changes in the parties’ circumstances were 
consistent with the parties’ expectations when they married because the 
premarital agreement contemplated that the parties would raise children 
together.295 
In a Georgia case involving a similar issue, the parties signed a premarital 
agreement that barred the division of marital property and set forth a specified 
formula for alimony.296  At the time of execution, the wife’s net worth was 
$10,000 and the husband’s was $8,500,000.297  The parties had four children 
during the marriage.298  After eighteen years of marriage, the husband, whose net 
worth had increased to $22,700,000, filed for divorce.299  The trial court enforced 
the agreement, whereby the wife was to receive $2,900 in monthly alimony for 
four years.300  The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, 
emphasizing that it was not unforeseeable that the husband’s assets would grow 
in value significantly.301 
A different conclusion was reached in Mazzitelli v. Mazzitelli.302  In this case, 
the parties had contemplated having children when they married, but the wife 
contended she had assumed she would take a short break from her career to 
have a child and then resume her career.303  Instead, she stopped working 
outside the home for almost ten years to raise the parties’ children.304  The 
appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the agreement should 
not be enforced based on the change in the parties’ circumstances.305 
Finally, in a South Carolina case analyzing the foreseeability of changed 
circumstances,306 the wife had various health problems when the parties 
married.307  At the time of divorce, her health problems had become more severe 
and she was totally disabled.308  The South Carolina Supreme Court found this 
result foreseeable and enforced the agreement.309 
 
 294.  Winchester v. McCue, 882 A.2d 143 at 149. 
 295.  Crews, 989 A.2d at 1071–72.  Reed v. Reed is another case involving a long marriage where the 
parties had signed a premarital agreement and the appellate court ruled that it was foreseeable that 
over the course of a marriage of twenty-six years each party might accumulate substantially different 
amounts of assets, so the agreement was enforced.  693 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
 296.  Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Ga. 2005). 
 297.  Id. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  Id. 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  See also Reed v. Reed, 693 N.W.2d 825 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a substantial 
increase in value of a party’s assets during a lengthy marriage was foreseeable). 
 302.  2005 WL 221683 (Minn. App. 2005). 
 303.  Id. at *2. 
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Id. at *3.  See also Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (Conn. 2011) (holding that the parties’ 
marital agreement was unconscionable due to changed circumstances). 
 306.  Hardee v. Hardee, 585 S.E.2d 501 (S.C. 2003). 
 307.  Id. at 502. 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. at 505. 
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Within the past decade, while a few courts have invalidated an agreement 
based on changed circumstances, a number of courts have ruled that various 
changes in the circumstances of the parties, regardless of whether they were 
substantial, were foreseeable at the time of execution and therefore were not 
grounds for invalidating the agreement. 
C. Restrictions Upon the Right to Spousal Support 
Under the UPAA, spousal support waivers generally are enforced unless 
the waiving party would become a public charge after divorce.310  Furthermore, a 
few non-UPAA states have enforced a spousal support waiver even when the 
waiving spouse would become a public charge if it was foreseeable that this 
could occur when the agreement was signed.311 
In contrast, some states do not permit a restriction of the right to spousal 
support in a premarital agreement.312  In other states, courts sometimes have 
found a waiver of the right to spousal support to be unconscionable at the time 
of divorce and therefore unenforceable.313 
For example, one court stated that a contractual restriction on alimony 
should not be enforced if the waiving party will not be able to provide for his or 
her reasonable post-divorce needs.314  Another view is that, if the waiving party 
would thereby experience a substantial change in circumstances from the marital 
standard of living after divorce, the agreement should not be enforced.315  A few 
states have adopted a rule that a contractual restriction of spousal support 
should not be enforced if it would be unconscionable to do so.316  The Illinois 
statute provides that if a contractual restriction on the right to spousal support 
would cause a spouse “undue hardship in light of circumstances not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of execution[,] . . . a court . . . may require the other party 
to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid such hardship.”317  In one 
Illinois case, the parties were married for eight years and had no children.318  The 
parties’ incomes at divorce were very different.319  The parties, represented by 
independent counsel, had signed a premarital agreement containing a waiver of 
 
 310.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, §6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001).  See also, Cron v. Cron, 8 
A.D.3d 186 (App. Div. 2004). 
 311.  See Hardee v. Hardee, 585 S.E.2d 501, 505 (S.C. 2003); Baker v. Baker, 622 So.2d 541, 543–44 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 312.  See supra Part II. B. 3. 
 313.  See DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 762 N.E.2d 797 (Mass. 2002) (stating that spousal support 
waivers would not be enforced). 
 314.  See In re Marriage of Dechant, 867 P.2d 193 (Colo. App. 1993). 
 315.  See Rogers v. Gordon, 961 A.2d 11, 20–21 ( N.J. Super. Ct. 2008); Warren v. Warren, 523 N.E. 
680, 683 (1988) (stating that a total waiver of maintenance was not fair or reasonable); Upham v. 
Upham, 630 N.E.2d 307, 310–11 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that a complete waiver of maintenance 
was not fair or reasonable). 
 316.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-307(2) (West 2011); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (West 2004). 
 317.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(b) (West 2009). 
 318.  In re Marriage of Barnes, 755 N.E.2d 522, (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). 
 319.  See id. at 524. 
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spousal support.320  The court found that a transition from a “lifestyle of luxury” 
to a $24,000 annual salary after divorce was not an undue hardship.321 
Likewise, in Indiana, if a contractual restriction on the right to spousal 
maintenance causes “extreme hardship under circumstances not reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of execution[,] . . . a court . . . may require the other party 
to provide spousal maintenance to the extent necessary to avoid extreme 
hardship.”322  In one Indiana case, the parties were married for four years and 
had no children.323  Before they married, they signed a premarital agreement 
waiving, among other things, a claim for maintenance.324  In this case there was 
testimony that the husband’s annual income exceeded $200,000, that the wife 
was “never allowed to work after [marriage],” and that, after the separation, the 
wife was then earning twenty-five dollars per hour.325  Here, the appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the enforcement of the maintenance waiver 
would present an extreme hardship to the wife.326 
V. A  COMPARATIVE VIEW 
A. England 
England has not passed legislation clarifying when marital agreements 
contemplating divorce will be enforced.  However, recent judicial decisions have 
changed the ground rules so it now appears more likely that such agreements 
will be enforced. 
MacLeod v. MacLeod327 involved an American couple who married in 
Florida.328  They moved to the Isle of Man where they signed a postnuptial 
agreement.329  Both parties had independent counsel.330  In their later divorce, the 
English appellate court held that postnuptial agreements generally should be 
enforced unless a change in the parties’ circumstances would make enforcement 
of the contract “manifestly unjust.”331 
A 2010 case appears to accept the validity of prenuptial agreements.332  In 
Radmacher v. Granatino,333 the English Supreme Court announced the principle 
that prenuptial agreements should be enforced if they are fair.334  The English 
 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  See id. 
 322.  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-3-8(b) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 323.  VanWagner v. VanWagner, 868 N.E.2d 924 (Table), No. 10A04-0606-CV-342, 2007 WL 
1775555 at  *3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
 324.  Id. at *2. 
 325.  Id. at *3. 
 326.  See id. 
 327.  (2008) UKPC 64 (Eng.). 
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  Id. 
 331.  Id.  See generally Jo Miles, Agreements for Grown-ups?, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 285 (2009). 
 332.  See Radmacher v. Granatino, [2010] UKSC 42 (Eng.). 
 333.  [2010] UKSC 42 (Eng.). 
 334.  See Andrew Meehan, Radmacher in the Supreme Court: What Does It All Mean? 40 FAM. LAW 
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court then set forth some general guidelines regarding when premarital 
agreements should be enforced.335  In terms of procedural requirements, the 
court stated that an enforceable agreement was one entered into without undue 
influence where the parties were informed of its implications.336  Regarding 
substantive fairness, the court outlined that trial courts should consider whether 
the parties’ circumstances had changed in unforeseen ways since the agreement 
was signed.337 
The recent English decisions make it more likely marital agreements will be 
enforced in English divorces but do not clarify in great detail when equitable 
concerns will cause courts to invalidate agreements. 
B. New Zealand 
New Zealand has a statute dealing with the enforcement of premarital 
agreements.338  What might be most surprising to American readers is that, 
among other formalities, to create an enforceable agreement each party must 
receive independent legal advice.339  In addition, an agreement can be set aside if 
enforcement would cause a “serious injustice,”340 a higher standard than mere 
unfairness.341  In deciding whether there would be a serious injustice, the statute 
directs courts to consider, among other things, the length of time since the 
agreement was made, whether the agreement was unfair or unreasonable when 
signed, and whether the agreement has become unfair or unreasonable in light of 
changes in circumstances since the date of execution.342 
C. Australia 
Australia has also legislated standards for prenuptial agreements 
contemplating divorce.  Like New Zealand, the original statute, adopted in 2000, 
mandated independent representation as a precondition for an enforceable 
agreement.343  Such agreements may address both property division and spousal 
 
1284 (2010); David Hodson, English Marital Agreements for International Families after Radmacher, 2011 
INT’L FAM. LAW 31 (2011); Julia Werdigier, Supreme Court in Britain Gives More Legal Force to Prenuptial 
Agreements, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2010, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/ 
world/europe/21divorce.html. 
 335.  Id. 
 336.  See Nina Dethloff, Contracting in Family Law: A European Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF 
FAMILY PROPERTY IN EUROPE 65, 73 (Katharina Boele-Woelki, Jo Miles & Jens Scherpe eds. 2011). 
 337.  Id.  See also Hayley Trim, Radmacher v. Granatino: The Wait is Over, 40 FAM. LAW 1185 
(2010).  For a discussion of English law regarding premarital agreements before McLeod and 
Radmacher, see Nigel Lowe & Roger Kay, The Status of Prenuptial Agreements in English Law – 
Eccentricity or Sensible Pragmatism?, in FAMILY FINANCES 395 (Bea Verschraegen ed. 2009). 
 338.  See Bill Atkin & Wendy Parker, RELATIONSHIP PROPERTY IN NEW ZEALAND 193 (2d. ed. 2009) 
(discussing § 21F of the Property (Relationships) Act of 1976). 
 339.  See id. 
 340.  Id. at 194 (discussing § 21J of the Property (Relationships) Act of 1976). 
 341.  Id. at 196. 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  See Belinda Fehlberg & Bruce Smyth, Binding Pre-nuptial Agreements in Australia: The First 
Year, 16 INT’L J. L. POL’Y & FAM. 127, 128, 130–31 (2002). 
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maintenance.344  Enforcement can be avoided, however, if circumstances change 
during marriage so that enforcement would be “impracticable.”345  Another 
ground for avoiding an agreement is unconscionable conduct.346  Maintenance 
restrictions are not enforced if a party would thereby qualify for a government 
benefit.347  An agreement can also be set aside due to fraud.348  If the agreement 
was executed under coercive circumstances, the agreement may be 
invalidated.349 
Certain amendments were made to Australian premarital agreement rules, 
effective in January 2010.  The most important of these gives a court the right to 
enforce an agreement if “it would be unjust and inequitable” not to enforce it, 
even if certain procedural requirements, such as the receipt of independent legal 
advice, were not followed.350  However, courts are given no guidance about how 
to make the determination whether it would be “unjust and inequitable” not to 
enforce the agreement.351 
D. Canada 
In Canada premarital agreements contemplating the economic 
consequences of divorce are generally valid.352  These agreements are regulated 
by provincial law, not federal law.353  Some provincial laws provide grounds to 
invalidate such agreements.  In Ontario, Canada’s largest province, premarital 
agreements may not impact rights in the matrimonial home.354  Enforcement of 
an agreement can be avoided if a party failed to disclose significant assets at the 
time of execution355 or if the waiving party did not understand the nature and 
consequences of the contract.356  Prior to signing an agreement, the parties must 
disclose their assets as well as the value of those assets.357  In one case, the 
agreement was not enforced where the wealthy spouse did not accurately 
disclose the value of his assets and encouraged the other party to fire her 
 
 344.  Id. at 129–30. 
 345.  Id. at 131; Patrick Parkinson, Setting Aside Financial Agreements, 15 AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 26, 45 
(2001). 
 346.  See Parkinson, supra note 345, at 48. 
 347.  See Owen Jessep, Section 90G and Pt. VIIIA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 24 AUSTL. J. FAM. 
L. 104, 105 (2010). 
 348.  See Blackmore & Webber (2009) FMCA Fam. 154 (noting that, where the husband’s 
nondisclosure of financial information was found to be fraud,the agreement was not enforced); Grant 
& Grant-Lovett (2010) FMCA Fam. 162 (noting that, where the husband’s nondisclosure of financial 
information was found to be fraud, the agreement was not enforced). 
 349.  See Blackmore & Webber, supra note 348. 
 350.  See Jessep, supra note 347, at 110–13. 
 351.  Id. 
 352.  See Stephen Grant, Prenuptial Agreements in Canada: The Exceptions Make the Rules, in 
INTERNATIONAL PRE-NUPTIAL AND POST-NUPTIAL AGREEMENTS 101, 101 (Family Law 2011). 
 353.  See id. 
 354.  See HUGH STARK & KIRSTIE MACLISE, DOMESTIC CONTRACTS (Thomson Reuters Canada) 
(discussing § 52 of the Ontario Family Law Act). 
 355.  Id. (discussing § 56(4) of the Family Law Act). 
 356.  Id. 
 357.  Id. (citing Dubin v. Dubin, 34 R.F.L. (5th) 227 (Ont. S.C.J.)). 
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aggressive and zealous lawyer and instead hire another more compliant lawyer 
at the last minute.358  Under Ontario law, the waiving party must “understand 
the nature and consequences” of the agreement for it to be enforceable.359  
Although consultation with independent counsel is not expressly required, 
obtaining independent legal counsel is the best way of satisfying this 
requirement.360  A waiver of spousal support is not enforceable if it would cause 
“unconscionable circumstances.”361 
In British Columbia, legislation gives a court discretion to not enforce the 
property provisions of a contract if it is “unfair” at divorce.362  In one case, a 
pregnant woman signed a premarital agreement on her wedding day that 
waived most of her rights to division of marital property.363  She had 
independent legal advice, the groom fully disclosed the extent of his assets, and 
there was no attempt to restrict spousal support.364  In spite of the wife’s claim 
that her pregnancy and the timing of her signing of the premarital agreement 
made it unfair, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the agreement.365  
Restrictions on the right to spousal support are more closely reviewed for 
unfairness.366 
E. Western Europe 
In many Western European countries, the default marital regime for 
spouses is one of community property of acquests.367  Spouses normally retain 
the right to select another regime such as separation of property.368  Under that 
alternative, there is no sharing of property either during or at the end of 
marriage.369  To choose an alternate regime, spouses must sign a written 
agreement before marriage; prior to doing so, most countries require they meet 
with a notary who explains to both parties the impact of the agreement.370  In 
 
 358.  See Nicholas Bala, Case Comment on LeVan v. LeVan: Over-Reaching in the Formation of a Pre-
nuptial Contract, 32 R.F.L. (6th) 374 (2007). 
 359.  Id. 
 360.  Id.  Another commentator has said that it would be a “rare case” where an agreement would 
be enforced in Ontario if both parties did not have independent counsel.  See Grant, supra note 352, at 
105–06.  In Alberta and New Brunswick, legislation expressly provides that a premarital agreement is 
enforceable only if both parties have independent legal counsel.  See id. at 105 n.18. 
 361.  See id. at 106–07. 
 362.  Id. 
 363.  See id. 
 364.  See id. 
 365.  Id.  See also Martha Shaffer, Domestic Contracts, Part II: The Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 20 CAN. J. FAM. L. 261 (2004). 
 366.  See Bala, supra note 358. 
 367.  See generally FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE (Carolyn Hamilton & Alison Perry eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
This type of community property system is the one accepted in the United States.  As a general rule, 
parties jointly own property accumulated by either spouse during marriage due to effort, while they 
do not share premarriage acquisitions by either spouse or a gift or inheritance received by either 
spouse during marriage.  Id. 
 368.  Id. 
 369.  Id. 
 370.  Id. 
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some countries, parties may not restrict post-divorce spousal support in a 
premarital agreement.371 
Although some countries permit marital contracts selecting a regime of 
separate property to be challenged at divorce on the ground of unfairness,372 in 
most countries such a selection will be enforced at divorce.373  A few countries 
have created a system of compensatory payments after divorce that cannot be 
limited by a premarital agreement.374  Provisions restricting the right to spousal 
support, where permitted, are scrutinized more rigorously for fairness.375 
F. Summary 
In many jurisdictions outside the United States, to make an enforceable 
premarital agreement both parties must consult with independent counsel or a 
civil law notary.  In most, there are significant restrictions on the right to limit 
post-divorce support or there is judicial review of the agreement at the time of 
divorce to see whether enforcement would impose an undue hardship on either 
party. 
VI.  PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE UPAA 
A. Procedural Revisions 
i. Clarifying What Constitutes Voluntary Execution 
Many United States courts now let the wealthy party “sandbag” the other in 
premarital agreement negotiations, allowing the party in favor of the agreement 
to wait until a day or two before the wedding to present a draft of a premarital 
agreement.376  This forces the less sophisticated party, at the last minute, to try to 
locate a lawyer and decide whether to sign the agreement or cancel the wedding.  
This is hugely unfair, wrong, and cries out for change. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has been critical of such bargaining 
strategies.  In re Estate of Hollett,377 for example, involved a wealthy spouse who 
mentioned the possibility of a premarital agreement two years before the 
eventual wedding date.378  The poorer spouse strongly objected, and the spouse 
 
 371.  See Nina Dethloff, Arguments for the Unification and Harmonization of Family Law in Europe, in 
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE UNIFICATION AND HARMONIZATION OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 50 n.74 
(Katharina Boele-Woelki ed., 2003) (referring to Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland).  See also 
Dethloff, Contracting in Family Law, supra note 336, at 82  n.122 (mentioning also Belgium, Denmark, 
Poland and Portugal). 
 372.  See Dethloff, Arguments for the Unification and Harmonization of Family Law in Europe, supra 
note 371, at § 2.3.4. 
 373.  Id. 
 374.  Id. at § 2.4 (mentioning France as an example). 
 375.  Id. 
 376.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795 (N.H. 2002); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 
N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994); Williams v. Williams, 720 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App. 1986). 
 377.  834 A.2d 348 (N.H. 2003). 
 378.  Id. at 350. 
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arguing for the agreement said nothing further.379  In holding the agreement 
invalid, the court stated: 
[A]lthough John’s lawyers had drafted a prenuptial agreement almost a month 
before the wedding, John did not obtain counsel for his wife or even inform her 
of the agreement until several days before the ceremony.  In other words, despite 
having every opportunity to negotiate the agreement well before the wedding, 
John elected to conduct his affairs so that Erin had no time to choose her own 
counsel, and very little time to negotiate and reflect upon the agreement.380 
As discussed above, courts often analyze the issue of whether an agreement 
was voluntary signed by asking whether the spouse being asked to waive rights 
was compelled to sign the agreement.381  Because of this focus, many courts have 
held that an agreement should not be invalidated based on the fact that it was 
presented at the last minute.382 
I would submit this is the wrong focus.  Perhaps it is necessary to reframe 
the issue.  The proposed model statute383 states that an agreement should not be 
enforced if the circumstances surrounding execution placed “undue pressure” on 
the party being asked to waive rights.384  Such a revision of the standard would 
clarify that the issue is not “voluntariness” as that concept has been framed by 
most courts but whether the bargaining process was consistent with the 
confidential relationship that exists between prospective spouses.  Did the 
spouse being asked to waive rights have a reasonable opportunity to decide 
whether to consult with independent counsel?  Did that party have adequate 
time to consider any legal advice obtained?  Did that spouse have a reasonable 
amount of time to decide whether to sign the agreement before the distractions 
and pressures of an impending wedding became overwhelming?  In contrast, 
many courts today apply a much lower standard of review, upholding 
agreements even where unfair bargaining has occurred.  For example, in Estate of 
Ingmand,385 the court enforced the agreement despite the fact that it found one 
party had “tricked” the other and employed “surprise pressure tactics.”386 
Numerous courts have recognized that engaged people have a confidential 
or fiduciary relationship.387  As the Washington Supreme Court observed: 
 
 379.  Id. 
 380.  Id. at 353. 
 381.  Supra Part I. B. i. 
 382.  See In re Marriage of Yannalfo, 794 A.2d 795, 797–98 (N.H. 2002); Howell v. Landry, 386 
S.E.2d 610, 612 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989). 
 383.  See infra Schedule A. 
 384.  See id. 
 385.  No. 00-1281, 2001 WL 855406 (Iowa Ct. App. July 31, 2001). 
 386.  Id. at *3. 
 387.   See Sogg v. Nevada State Bank, 832 P.2d 781, 784 (Nev. 1992); Cannon v. Cannon, 865 A.2d 
563, 573 (Md. Ct. App. 2005); Griffin v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 96, 99–100 (2004); In re Estate of Hollett, 834 
A.2d 348, 351 (N.H. 2003); In re Marriage of Drag, 762 N.E.2d 1111, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); Wiley v. 
Iverson, 985 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Mont. 1999); Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d  815, 821 (Tenn. 1996); 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ohio 1994); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 449 S.E.2d 502, 504 
(Va. Ct. App. 1994); Pajak v. Pajak, 385 S.E.2d 384, 389 (W. Va. 1989); Tiryakian v. Tiryakian, 370 
S.E.2d 852, 854 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Rosenberg v. Lipnick, 389 N.E.2d 385, 388 (Mass. 1979); Merrill 
Oldham_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:20 AM 
 A REEVALUATION OF THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT 117 
 
Parties to a pre-nuptial agreement do not deal with each other at arm’s length.  
Their relationship is one of mutual confidence and trust which calls for the 
exercise of good faith, candor and sincerity in all matters bearing upon the 
proposed agreement.  The basic objective of this common sense rule is to prevent 
overreaching.388 
Premarital agreements should not be governed by contract rules applicable 
to commercial contracts.  The relationship of parties planning to marry in the 
near future is much more complex and, as the past forty years of premarital 
agreement bargaining and litigation have shown, a party may need additional 
protection from abusive bargaining tactics.  For example, in California one 
spouse is barred from taking “unfair advantage” of the other.389  If the focus were 
shifted from voluntariness to undue pressure, such a standard would be more in 
keeping with the confidential relationship of the parties and would reduce the 
ability of one spouse to take unfair advantage of the other. 
A new standard for premarital agreement bargaining could be implemented 
in the form of a general rule.  For example, a statute could be enacted requiring 
that a premarital agreement be presented a sufficient time before the wedding so 
the party to whom the agreement is presented will have adequate time, without 
being placed under undue pressure, to: (i) consider whether to consult an 
attorney; (ii) locate and consult with independent counsel, if legal advice is 
desired; and (iii) decide whether to sign the agreement.  Such a general standard 
would give courts some flexibility in applying the rule to different situations. 
However, it could present some problems.  First, some courts might 
construe such a general statute as not changing existing standards for 
determining whether to enforce a premarital agreement.  Second, if the statute 
would be construed as changing existing standards, it would not be clear to 
parties what is required until case law developed clarifying the rule.  I propose 
that a clear set of minimum bargaining rules would therefore be preferable. 
U.S. law has long recognized that, even absent a confidential relationship, a 
party can be pressured into signing an agreement, and the agreement therefore 
should not be considered binding.  For example, consumer protection laws 
sometimes give a party to such an agreement three to seven days to rescind the 
agreement.390  Of course, it would not be fair to allow a party to sign a premarital 
 
v. Estate of Merrill, 552 P.2d 249, 250 (Or. 1976); Fick v. Fick, 851 P.2d 445, 449-450 (Nev. 1993); 
Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 732 (Colo. 1982); Watson v. Watson, 126 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Ill. 
1955); In re Broadie’s Estate, 493 P.2d 289, 293 (Kan. 1972); Hartz v. Hartz, 234 A.2d 865, 870 (Md. 
1967); In re Estate of Strickland, 149 N.W.2d 344, 351 (Neb. 1967); In re Estate of Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 
381, 385 (Minn. 1982); Braddock v. Braddock, 542 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Nev. 1975); Kosik v. George, 452 
P.2d 560, 563 (Or. 1969); In re Estate of Hillegass, 244 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. 1968); Hook v. Hook, 431 
N.E.2d 667, 669 (Ohio 1982). 
 388.  Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (Wash. 1972) (en banc). 
 389.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (West 2004).  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Balcof, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 183 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 390.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1689.6(b) (West 2011) (stating that a buyer has a seven-day right to 
cancel a home solicitation contract for a personal emergency response unit); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
9-A, § 3-502(1-A) (2009) (stating that a buyer has a ten-day right to cancel a home food service plan); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-02(1) (stating that a buyer older than sixty-four has fifteen days to cancel a 
home solicitation contract); FLA. R. CT. 12.740(f)(1) (2011) (stating that counsel not present at a 
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agreement the day of the wedding, marry, and then rescind the agreement a few 
days after the wedding.  Another way to reduce the likelihood that a prospective 
spouse will agree to an oppressive premarital agreement as a result of last-
minute pressure is to slow down the negotiations.  Requiring a “cooling-off 
period” would allow the party to whom the agreement is presented to consider 
whether to retain counsel or ask for modifications to the agreement, as well as 
whether to refuse to sign it.391 
California has already adopted one type of cooling-off period for premarital 
agreements.392  The statute provides that an agreement will be considered 
voluntarily signed only if, among other things, at least seven days passed 
between the day the final version of the agreement was  presented and when it 
was signed.393  The appropriate amount of time for such a cooling-off period is 
debatable; seven days certainly is better than nothing, but it may be difficult, 
particularly for relatively unsophisticated parties, to find a lawyer within seven 
days. 
My proposal is not identical to California’s waiting period requirement, 
which has been construed to require a seven-day waiting period after the 
agreement is finalized.394  In contrast, my proposal only requires that the agreement 
not be signed until seven days after the first draft is presented; the parties would 
be free to negotiate and make revisions during that period.395 
Also, the California provision has been construed to apply only if a party is 
not represented by counsel.396  The waiting period I propose would apply to both 
represented and unrepresented parties.397  The primary purpose of this proposal 
is to make it impossible for the agreement to be signed without giving the party 
to whom the agreement is presented a period of time to consider whether to sign 
the agreement, consult an attorney, or request changes in the agreement.398  It is 
true that such a waiting period is not normally required before parties can make 
an enforceable agreement; however, in light of the confidential relationship that 
exists between an engaged couple and the history of abusive bargaining that has 
recently become common, such a waiting period is a desirable and necessary 
precaution. 
In addition to the waiting period requirement, other safeguards are needed.  
The ALI has proposed that, to give rise to a presumption that the agreement was 
voluntarily signed, the agreement must be signed by both parties at least thirty 
 
mediation may cancel a mediated settlement agreement within ten days); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-14-
703(a) (2003) (stating that a buyer of a camping site time share has five days to cancel). 
 391.  See generally Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1238 (2003) (discussing the benefits of a 
cooling-off period in certain situations). 
 392.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c) (West 2004). 
 393.  Id. 
 394.  See In re Marriage of Cadwell-Faso and Faso, 2011 WL 72179 at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 
2011). 
 395.  See infra Schedule A. 
 396.  Id. 
 397.  Id. 
 398.  Id. 
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days before the wedding.399  This requirement would deter last minute 
bargaining and encourage prospective spouses to finalize such agreements 
before the frenzy of the wedding weekend.  A similar rule of thumb—that 
premarital agreements should be signed at least a month before the wedding—
appears to be evolving in England.400 
Although it would certainly be wise to finalize such agreements long before 
the wedding date, a question remains: if a black letter rule is to be established, 
what should be the cut-off date?  Given the common practice of last-minute 
bargaining in the U.S., a change to thirty days before the wedding may be too 
drastic to try to impose at this time.  My proposed statute provides that 
agreements generally must be finalized and signed seven days before the 
wedding.401  (A rebuttable presumption of undue pressure arises if the 
agreement is signed within seven days of the wedding.402)  Although some might 
prefer the ALI’s suggested time period of thirty days, if this more modest 
proposal of seven days were accepted it would significantly improve the fairness 
of premarital agreement bargaining in the U.S. while not being too inconvenient 
for the parties. 
It is not unheard of to require that a contract be signed a certain number of 
days before an important event that could catalyze a significant amount of 
emotion.  For example, Texas has adopted a set of rules for drafting an 
enforceable surrogacy agreement.403  The statute requires, among other things, 
that the agreement be signed at least fourteen days before the embryo is 
implanted in the gestational mother.404  Among other things, this fourteen-day 
requirement gives the woman at least two weeks to change her mind after 
signing the agreement but before the process is begun. 
So, I would propose that, to improve the bargaining process for premarital 
agreements, as a general rule: (i) the agreement cannot be signed until a specified 
number of days have elapsed after a draft agreement is first presented, and (ii) 
the final agreement  generally must be signed by both parties a specified number 
of days before the wedding.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court has stated that 
“[i]ndependent counsel is useless without the ability and the time to make 
effective use of such counsel.”405  This proposed rule attempts to ensure that the 
party being asked to waive rights has adequate time to locate and consult 
independent counsel. 
The ALI Principles provide that, if the circumstances surrounding execution 
do not meet the standards set forth in Section 7.04(3) (such as being signed at 
 
 399.  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) (hereinafter “ALI PRINCIPLES”) § 7.04(3). 
 400.  See Romantic Small Print: England’s Supreme Court Upholds Prenuptial Agreements, ECONOMIST, 
Oct. 21, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17311887. 
 401.  See infra Schedule A. 
 402.  Id. 
 403.  See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 160.754(e) (Vernon 2011). 
 404.  See id. 
 405.  In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 348, 353 (N.H. 2003). 
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least thirty days before the wedding), no presumption arises regarding duress.406  
Given how courts have dealt with this problem in the past, the statute should be 
drafted such that the agreement is presumed unenforceable if the circumstances 
surrounding execution do not meet the requirements discussed above regarding 
a minimum time to deliberate and signing at least a certain  number of days 
before the wedding.  If the circumstances surrounding execution do meet the 
standards set forth, the agreement would be presumed valid.  Agreements that 
do not meet these standards presumptively should not be enforced except in 
those instances where parties have already informally reached an agreement 
regarding all material terms weeks before the wedding and memorialize it 
within two days of the wedding407 or where the negotiations have been 
continuing for a significant period and the agreement is finally signed within two 
days of the wedding. 
Gardner v. Gardner408 serves as an example where an agreement signed fewer 
than seven days before the wedding should be enforced.  In Gardner the party 
being asked to waive rights had a lawyer and received the initial draft of the 
agreement more than two months before the wedding.409  The parties exchanged 
proposed drafts and signed the final agreement three days before the wedding.410 
In addition, my proposal creates a conclusive presumption of undue 
pressure if the agreement is signed within forty-eight hours of the wedding.411  
This would be true regardless of the sophistication of the parties or the presence 
of independent counsel. 
An example of how this rule would affect current law can be seen by 
considering Winchester v. McCue.412  In this case, the first draft was provided 
seven days before the wedding, seven drafts were exchanged, and the parties 
signed the final agreement hours before the wedding.413  The waiving party was 
a lawyer who had independent counsel.414  Under the proposed schedule, a 
conclusive presumption of undue pressure would exist. 
The most significant impact of the acceptance of the bargaining rules I have 
proposed is that it is unlikely an agreement first presented fewer than fourteen 
days before the wedding will be enforced.  Agreements first presented a few 
days before the wedding would almost never be enforced. 
 
 406.  See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 399, at 964–65. 
 407.  As Brian Bix has noted, there could be a muddy distinction between situations where parties 
have discussed a premarital agreement and situations where they have agreed to all material terms.  See 
Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital Agreements and How We Think 
About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 188 (1998). 
 408.  527 N.W.2d 701 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
 409.  Id. at 705–06. 
 410.  See also Francavilla v. Francavilla, 969 So.2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Robinson v. 
Robinson, 64 So.3d 1067 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). 
 411.  See infra Schedule A. 
 412.  882 A.2d 143 (Conn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 413.  Id. at 145. 
 414.  Id. 
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ii. Disclosure of Financial Information 
Under the UPAA, inadequate disclosure of financial information is grounds 
for invalidating an agreement only if: (i) the party did not waive the right to 
receive such information, (ii) the party did not otherwise have access to such 
information, and, most surprisingly, (iii) the agreement was unconscionable 
when signed.415 
The UPAA rule that inadequate disclosure is grounds for invalidating the 
agreement only if it is also unconscionable when signed is unusually restrictive.  
In  a majority of  U.S. jurisdictions, inadequate disclosure alone is enough to 
invalidate the agreement.416  I would encourage the revision of the UPAA to 
follow this majority rule.417  Before a premarital waiver of financial rights may be 
enforced at divorce, it should be shown that the waiving party was already 
familiar with the other party’s financial condition or received adequate 
disclosure of such information in connection with the negotiation and execution 
of the agreement. 
The UPAA permits a party to waive the right to disclosure.  To ensure that 
any waiver of rights is a “knowing” waiver, particularly if independent counsel 
is not to be required, a waiver of disclosure should not be permitted. 
iii. Understanding the Consequences of the Agreement 
Numerous jurisdictions outside the U.S. enforce premarital agreements only 
where the waiving party understood the impact of the premarital agreement 
when it was signed; most require independent counsel or a consultation with a 
civil law notary.418  In addition, in a recent attempt to clarify English law, the 
Supreme Court of England stated that a premarital agreement should be 
enforced “where the parties were informed of its implications.”419  The English 
Law Commission proposed, in a recent Consultation Paper pertaining to marital 
property agreements, that an agreement should be enforced only if both parties 
received independent counsel.420  To date, U.S. jurisdictions do not require both 
parties to a premarital agreement have independent counsel.421  (This may in part 
be due to the added cost of such a requirement.)422  In a number of cases, the 
waiving party at divorce claimed that the scope and effect of the agreement was 
 
 415.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001). 
 416.  See supra Part III. B. 
 417.  Some “adopting” states made this change, such as Connecticut, Iowa, Nevada, and New 
Jersey.  See supra Part II. B. iv.  Professor Atwood has endorsed this change.  See Atwood, supra note 
45, at 149. 
 418.  See supra Part V. 
 419.  See supra Part II. B. iv. 
 420.  ENGLISH LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 198, MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS 
107 (2011). 
 421.  See supra Part III. C. 
 422.  A recent study commissioned by the English Law Commission found that English lawyers 
reported an average legal fee charged for representing a party in connection with a premarital 
agreement of approximately £5400, or a little more than $8,000.  LAW COMMISSION REPORT: A STUDY 
OF THE VIEWS AND APPROACHES OF FAMILY PRACTITIONERS CONCERNING MARITAL PROPERTY 
AGREEMENTS, at 52–53. 
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misrepresented when presented.423  In light of past U.S. reluctance to adopt a 
requirement that each party have independent counsel, it would be unwise to 
suggest such a requirement in any U.S. uniform law.  But if each party does not 
have a lawyer, how could it be made more likely that both parties at least 
understand the basic effect of the agreement?424 
As mentioned above, many states require, as a condition of enforcing a 
waiver of economic rights upon divorce, that the waiving party had sufficient 
information regarding the financial condition of the other party to have a general 
idea of what he or she was being asked to waive.  U.S. courts have been less 
concerned about whether the party waiving the rights understood the legal 
significance of what was being signed. 
The current California statute provides some guidance about how this could 
be accomplished.425  To create an enforceable premarital agreement, if the 
waiving party is not represented by independent counsel, before execution the 
other party must give the waiving party a written summary of “the terms and 
basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and obligations he or she [is] 
giving up by signing the agreement.”426  The ALI makes a similar suggestion that 
a presumption of voluntary execution could be established by adding such a 
summary to the agreement itself.427  It is not clear that the summary 
contemplated by the ALI proposal would be clearly visible; there is no 
requirement that the summary be in bold-faced type, for example.  It would be 
preferable to provide the summary in a separate document to the unrepresented 
party before the agreement is signed, as is required in California.  This 
requirement should be incorporated into a revised UPAA to help unrepresented 
parties understand the effect of the proposed agreement before it is signed. 
 
 423.  See, e.g., Ware v. Ware, 7 So.3d 271 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Liebelt v. Liebelt, 801 P.2d 52 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1990). 
 424.  Studies suggest that Americans generally are not familiar with legal rules.  See generally 
Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 234–36 (1989).  See 
also Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and 
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 441–45 (1993) (finding that 
people about to marry were not very familiar with rules applicable to marriage and divorce); Heather 
Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements?, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL JOHN M. OLIN CENTER 
FOR LAW, ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS DISCUSSION SERIES, Paper 436 (2003), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/436 (finding also that people who had recently applied for a 
marriage license had little knowledge about how marriage affected their rights).  Some commentators 
have argued that both parties should be required to have independent counsel in the U.S.  See Gail 
Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 229 (1994); Judith T. 
Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
349 (2007); Bix, supra note 407, at 207; David Westfall, Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The ALI’s 
Recommendation for Division of Property, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY (Robin Wilson ed. 2006) 180. 
 425.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c)(3) (West 2004). 
 426.  Id.  If the right to spousal support is impacted, the waiving party must have counsel. 
 427.  See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 399, at § 7.04(3)(c).  In Texas, spouses can agree to transform 
separate property into community property. Such an agreement is enforceable, however, only if the 
agreement sets forth the legal effect of converting property from separate to community.  See TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.205(a)(2) (Vernon 2011). 
Oldham_Paginated (Do Not Delete) 3/13/2012  10:20 AM 
 A REEVALUATION OF THE UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT 123 
 
iv. Summary 
I am proposing that premarital agreements be enforced only if the 
circumstances surrounding execution satisfy various specific bargaining 
safeguards.  Many U.S. courts over the past few decades have permitted 
oppressive and unfair bargaining in connection with premarital agreements, and 
clearly defined bargaining limits need to be promulgated. 
Even if the drafters of the revised UPAA decide to retain a set of rules 
giving parties substantial assurance that an agreement will be enforced, it is 
difficult to quarrel with more robust, while still reasonable, procedural 
safeguards where the ground rules are clearly set forth.  If more substantial 
procedural safeguards would be added to existing requirements, the party 
desiring an enforceable agreement merely would need to be sure that the 
circumstances surrounding execution comply with this new set of rules. 
B. Limiting the Enforcement of Agreements Due to Substantive Fairness 
Concerns 
In addition to the procedural requirements discussed in the preceding 
section, a separate, and perhaps more difficult, issue is whether parts or all of a 
premarital agreement should not be enforced due to substantive fairness 
concerns.  A question related to the latter issue is whether any limits should be 
placed on the ability of parties to change the rules governing the economic 
consequences of divorce. 
i. Restrictions Upon or Waivers of the Right to Spousal Support 
It seems fair to say that there is no U.S. consensus regarding the extent to 
which parties should be able to restrict the right to spousal support.  The UPAA 
allows waivers of spousal support unless the waiving spouse would become a 
public charge.428  If the spouse would thereby become a public charge, the court 
is authorized to award such support so that the waiving party would not qualify 
for public benefits.429 
A number of other states have established more limits upon the ability of 
parties to restrict the right to spousal support.  For example, even some adopting 
states bar restrictions on the right to spousal support.430  In California, a 
restriction on spousal support is only enforceable if the party agreeing to the 
restriction was represented by independent counsel.  Such a restriction will not 
be enforced even with advice of counsel if the provision is unconscionable at 
divorce.431 
In Colorado, spousal support restrictions are unenforceable if the waiving 
party would as a result not be able to provide for his or her reasonable post-
divorce needs.432  Another approach is to not enforce such a waiver if the 
 
 428.  See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001). 
 429.  Id. 
 430.  See supra Part II. B. iii. (mentioning Iowa, South Dakota, and New Mexico). 
 431.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615. 
 432.  See In re Marriage of Dechant, 867 P.2d 193 (Colo. App. 1993). 
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waiving party would thereby experience a substantial change in circumstances 
from the marital standard of living after divorce.433 
In Indiana, spousal support restrictions are not to be enforced if they would 
result in “extreme hardship.”434  Illinois bars the enforcement of such restrictions 
if the restrictions would cause “undue hardship” as a result of an unforeseeable 
change of circumstances during marriage.435  In other states, where an agreement 
is not to be enforced if unconscionable at divorce, courts have been more inclined 
to find unconscionability if there was a waiver of both equitable distribution and 
the right to spousal support.436 
In a few states, the right to spousal support may not be impacted.  In many 
states, there is almost total contractual freedom, while in a number of others a 
restriction on spousal support is subject to some sort of fairness review.  Given 
this lack of agreement, what might be a sensible compromise? 
One option would be to distinguish between marriages where parties raise a 
common biological or adoptive child and childless marriages.  In relationships 
where the parties raise children, the primary caretaker customarily incurs 
lifetime career damage.437  This damage can leave the primary caretaker 
economically vulnerable in the event of divorce, and the damage may be 
unforeseeable before the parties marry.438  Because of this unique aspect of 
marriages with children, couples in childless marriages should be free to restrict 
or eliminate spousal support while those who raise children together should not. 
This proposed change would not place a dramatic restriction on the ability 
of couples with children to modify their rights upon divorce.  For example, 
consider the result in Gross v. Gross.439  There the wealthy party was able to retain 
the $6,000,000 that had been accumulated during marriage, but the premarital 
agreement’s support restriction was not enforced, so the waiving party received 
indefinite monthly support of $2,500.440  This result is vastly different from what 
would have occurred absent an agreement. 
Similarly, in Millstein v. Millstein,441 the husband had assets worth $28 
million when the marriage began; after nineteen years of marriage his net worth 
was $120 million.442  The court upheld the agreement waiving equitable 
distribution and awarded the wife indefinite monthly alimony of $9,000.443 
 
 433.  See Rogers v. Gordon, 961 A.2d 11 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2008). 
 434.  See IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-11-3-8 (West 2001) 
 435.  See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/7(b) (West 2009). 
 436.  See supra notes 257–70 and accompanying text. 
 437.  See generally Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 1513, 1519–27 (2005).  See also J. Thomas Oldham, 80 CALIF. L. REV 1091 (1992) (book 
review); David Leonhardt, The Different Costs of Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/18/the-different-costs-of-motherhood/. 
 438.  See Starnes, supra note 437. 
 439.  464 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio 1984). 
 440.  See id. at 510. 
 441.  2002 WL 31031676 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002). 
 442.  Id. at *10, *15. 
 443.  Id. at *19. 
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Likewise, in Lane v. Lane,444 the court enforced the waiver of equitable 
distribution—thereby allowing the wealthy spouse to retain most of the 
property—but declined to enforce the maintenance waiver, so the waiving party 
was awarded a monthly payment of $12,000 for three years.445 
The approach suggested here would always give the court the power, in 
those marriages where the parties raised children, to award support to a 
dependent spouse upon divorce.  In contrast, parties in childless marriages 
generally would be able to restrict or eliminate the possibility of spousal support 
if they so desired. 
ii. Not Enforcing an Agreement Due to Substantive Unfairness 
If the proposals suggested above are enacted, is there a need for any type of 
fairness review of premarital agreements?  Under the UPAA, substantive fairness 
is considered only at the time of execution, and an agreement is unenforceable 
only if found “unconscionable” at that time and the waiving party did not have 
adequate information regarding the other party’s financial condition.446  Two 
features of the UPAA rule should be noted.  On one hand, the focus is on the 
time of execution, not enforcement.  In addition, an agreement is enforceable—in 
spite of its unconscionability upon execution—if the waiving party had adequate 
financial information or waived the right to such information.  In many other 
non-UPAA states, the focus is on the unconscionability of the agreement at the 
time of enforcement, not execution, and a finding of unconscionability alone is 
sufficient to render an agreement unenforceable.447 
This is consistent with the evolving rules in other jurisdictions.  A recent 
 
 444.  202 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. 2006). 
 445.  Id. at 579. 
 446. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, § 6, 9C U.L.A. 48–49 (2001). 
 447.  See supra Part IV. A.  This is true in some states that adopted the UPAA with some changes, 
such as Connecticut, New Jersey, and North Dakota.  See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §46b-36g(a)(2) 
(West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §37:2-37 (West 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-07 (2009). 
I have discussed elsewhere the appropriate time for a review of the unconscionability of a premarital 
agreement: 
Admittedly, courts normally determine the unconscionability of a commercial contract 
according to the circumstances existing at the time of execution.  Still, marital contracts are 
somewhat different from commercial transactions.  First, in marital contracts spouses plan 
for what will occur at dissolution. The marriage, however, may not be dissolved for 
decades.  The term of most commercial contracts is much shorter.  Second, important 
public policy concerns relate to the circumstances of the spouses at divorce, not at the time 
the contract was signed. The circumstances of spouses can change dramatically during a 
marriage.  For example, one spouse may develop health problems or may have a 
diminished earning capacity as a result of working solely as a homemaker.  Few would 
dispute that the state has a strong interest in attempting to ensure that each spouse will be 
financially self-sufficient after divorce, and that any children will be adequately supported.  
Consequently, the state has a strong interest in policing the substantive fairness of the 
division of property at divorce. The circumstances of the parties at the time the marital 
contract was signed are irrelevant to these public policy concerns.  So, the . . . focus upon 
the fairness of a marital contract solely at the time of execution seems unwise.  If 
substantive fairness is to be relevant to the question of enforceability of marital contracts, 
the focus should be upon the fairness of the contract at divorce. 
J. Thomas Oldham, Premarital Agreements Are Now Enforceable, Unless . . ., 21 HOUS. L. REV. 757, 775–76 
(1984) (citations omitted). 
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English decision states that marital agreements should be enforced only if they 
are “fair” and there has not been a change in the parties’ circumstances so 
enforcement of the agreement would not be “manifestly unjust.”448  In New 
Zealand, an agreement is not to be enforced if it would cause “serious 
injustice.”449  If there was unconscionable conduct, the agreement is not to be 
enforced in Australia.450  “Unfair” agreements are not enforceable in British 
Columbia.451 
Some commentators have been critical of the lack of a significant review of 
the substantive fairness of premarital agreements at divorce.452  A few urge a 
return to the old rule that premarital agreements attempting to change the rules 
governing the economic consequences of divorce should not be permitted.453  
Other commentators have proposed a more rigorous review of the substantive 
fairness of agreements at the time of divorce.454  Professor Brod has proposed 
that an agreement should be reviewed at divorce for its “economic justice.”455  
Another has suggested that courts should consider an agreement that does not 
provide for an approximately equal division of marital property presumptively 
unenforceable.456  Professors Atwood and Younger have argued that agreements 
that are unconscionable at divorce should not be enforced.457 
The ALI Principles also suggest a relatively substantial fairness review of an 
agreement at divorce.458  Under the ALI, an agreement is not to be enforced if the 
objecting party can establish that enforcement would “work a substantial 
injustice.”459 
The current UPAA position regarding the level of substantive fairness 
review at divorce is significantly different from the scrutiny applied in many 
jurisdictions, as well as the recommendation made in the ALI Principles and by 
numerous U.S. commentators.  An apparent concern of the UPAA drafters was 
to provide a set of rules that would result in agreements being enforced in almost 
all instances.  Of course, it does seem important to promulgate a set of rules that 
will generally allow parties to predict when agreements will be enforced.  
However, there are other legitimate societal concerns that arise when 
 
 448.  See supra notes 327–31 and accompanying text. 
 449.  See supra notes 340–41 and accompanying text. 
 450.  See supra note 346 and accompanying text. 
 451.  See supra note 362 and accompanying text. 
 452.  See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEVE. 
ST. L. REV. 359 (2006); Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Should Marital Property Rights Be Inalienable? 
Preserving the Marriage Ante, 82 NEB. L. REV. 460 (2003). 
 453.  See Sherman, supra note 452; McLaughlin, supra note 452. 
 454.  See Brod, supra note 424 (defining an economically unjust agreement as one where a party is 
significantly worse off economically than before marriage). 
 455.  See id. 
 456.  See Comment, Marriage as Contract and Marriage as Partnership: The Future of Antenuptial 
Agreement Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2075 (2003). 
 457.  See Atwood, supra note 45; Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An 
Update, 8 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 42 (1992). 
 458.  See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 399, at § 7.05. 
 459.   See id. 
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contemplating the extent to which parties should be able to modify the economic 
consequences of divorce.  If a party will suffer substantial hardship after divorce 
due to the enforcement of an agreement, this hardship is a legitimate 
consideration when evaluating potential limits on parties’ ability to change the 
rules applicable to the economic consequences of divorce.460 
A potential compromise between the current UPAA position and the view 
proposed in the ALI Principles would be to enforce an agreement unless the 
court finds the terms are unconscionable at divorce.461  I have previously 
proposed another approach to this issue: courts should inquire whether there 
was a substantial and unforeseen change in the parties’ circumstances during 
marriage.462  My proposed standard reflects my previous recommendation. 
This proposed standard should not result in wholesale invalidation of 
premarital agreements.  As the discussion above shows, courts have only rarely 
invalidated agreements in states currently applying this standard.463 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
promulgated the UPAA about a decade after the concept of premarital 
agreements contemplating divorce was first tentatively accepted in the U.S.464  
The fundamental goal of the UPAA drafters seemed to be to formulate a set of 
rules that would make it very likely premarital agreements would be enforced 
upon divorce.465  While this overarching goal may still be useful, it is clear that 
some revisions to the UPAA are now needed to protect parties from unfair 
bargaining tactics and the extreme unfairness which often results from 
substantial changes in the circumstances of the parties during marriage. 
The UPAA’s most glaring problem is that it has sanctioned oppressive 
bargaining.  Courts have often enforced agreements where the more 
sophisticated party first presented the agreement a day or two before the 
wedding and informed the other (normally unsophisticated) party that the 
agreement must be signed or the wedding will be called off.  This places the 
other party in an extremely difficult situation.  It is quite unlikely that 
independent counsel can be located and consulted on such short notice.  In 
addition, there is little time to consider any advice received or to reflect upon the 
agreement’s terms and negotiate changes.  The (normally unsophisticated) party 
being asked to waive rights therefore is forced to decide, frequently once 
 
 460.  See generally Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1059 (1988). 
 461.  See id. at 1089–90; Ronald Ladden & Robert Franco, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: An 
Ill-Reasoned Retreat from the Unconscionability Analysis, 4 AMER. J. FAM. L. 267, 274–77 (1990); S. 
Christine Mercing, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act: Survey of tis Impact in Texas and 
Across the Nation, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 825 (1990); Suzanne Reynolds, Premarital Agreements, 13 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 343 (1991). 
 462.  See Oldham, Premarital Agreements Are Now Enforceable, supra note 447, at 778. 
 463.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 464.  UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9C U.L.A. 39 (2001). 
 465.  See id. 
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wedding festivities have already begun and without the benefit of independent 
counsel, whether to sign the agreement as presented or cancel the wedding.  If a 
waiver of substantial rights in a premarital agreement is to be enforceable, a 
fairer system must be put in place to guarantee the waiver was freely and 
knowingly signed without undue pressure. 
The model statute attached as Schedule A contemplates that the bargaining 
process could be improved by generally requiring that: (i) the party being asked 
to waive rights be given at least seven days after the agreement is first presented 
to consider whether to retain counsel, ask for revisions, and sign the agreement; 
and (ii) the agreement generally needs to be signed by both parties at least seven 
days before the wedding.466  An agreement signed within forty-eight hours of the 
wedding would never be enforced.467  These requirements would guarantee that 
the party being asked to waive rights would have more notice of the issue (at 
least two weeks before the wedding) than is common today and would have 
more time to consider whether to meet with independent counsel or negotiate 
changes.  In addition, the proposal encourages parties to decide whether to sign 
the agreement or cancel the wedding a week before the wedding instead of (as 
commonly occurs now) when the wedding weekend had already begun. It is 
likely parties could make a more intelligent decision regarding whether to sign 
the agreement if the decision is made a week—not hours—before the wedding. 
It is not uncommon for parties not represented by counsel to contend at 
dissolution of a marriage that they misunderstood the effect of the premarital 
agreement.468  Perhaps for this reason, some countries require both parties have 
independent counsel before a premarital agreement will be enforced.  My 
proposal does not include such a requirement, at least in part because U.S. courts 
and legislatures have been so reluctant to accept such a requirement.  This 
proposal does require that, if a party is not represented by counsel, and the other 
is, the other party (or the lawyer for that party) must give a written summary of 
the general effect of the agreement to the unrepresented party, in a document 
independent of the agreement itself, before the agreement is signed.469  The 
proposal also requires each party be “generally informed” regarding the assets 
and income of the other party; a waiver of this requirement is not permitted.470 
These proposed changes to the rules governing whether to enforce a 
premarital agreement are suggested to make it more likely that the party being 
asked to waive rights will be aware of the agreement’s impact on his or her rights 
and will have more time to consider whether to sign the proposed agreement or 
propose revisions.  When compared to current law, the bargaining standards 
reflected in this proposal are more congruent with the confidential relationship 
that exists between people engaged to be married. 
The attached proposal also includes substantive fairness limits on 
 
 466.  See infra Schedule A. 
 467.  See id. 
 468.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shirilla, 89 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2004); In re Estate of Smid, 756 N.W.2d 1 
(S.D. 2008); Holler v. Holler, 612 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 469.  See infra Schedule A. 
 470.  See id. 
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premarital agreements.  Parties who raise one or more common biological or 
adoptive children are barred from restricting the right to spousal support.  In 
addition, a court is instructed not to enforce the agreement if it would cause 
undue hardship to a spouse because the circumstances of the parties changed 
during marriage for reasons not foreseeable by the parties when they married.  
These provisions include some minimal protection for dependent spouses if a 
divorce occurs while still granting prospective spouses substantial freedom to 
modify customary economic consequences of divorce. 
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SCHEDULE A 
SUGGESTED STATUTORY SCHEME TO REGULATE PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS 
CONTEMPLATING DIVORCE 
1. Enforcement 
A premarital agreement should be enforced if: 
(a) circumstances surrounding execution did not place undue pressure on either 
party; 
(b) each party was generally informed regarding the assets and income of the 
other party when the agreement was signed; 
(c) each party generally understood the legal effect of the agreement; and 
(d) enforcement would not cause undue hardship to either party due to a change 
in the parties’ circumstances during marriage that was not foreseeable at the time 
the agreement was signed. 
2. Undue Pressure 
(a) A presumption arises that the circumstances surrounding execution of the 
agreement did not place undue pressure on either party if: 
(1) the final agreement was signed a minimum of seven days after the initial 
written draft of the agreement was delivered to both parties; and 
(2) the agreement was signed by both parties a minimum of seven days before 
the wedding. 
(b) If the timing of the negotiation or execution of the agreement did not comply 
with section (2) (a) hereof, a rebuttable presumption arises that the circumstances 
surrounding execution placed undue pressure on the parties. 
(c) A conclusive presumption that the circumstances surrounding execution of 
the agreement placed undue pressure on the parties shall arise if the agreement 
is signed within forty-eight hours of the wedding. 
3. Understanding the Legal Effect of the Agreement 
A party generally understands the legal effect of the agreement if: 
(1) the party was represented by independent counsel selected by that party in 
connection with the negotiations regarding the agreement; or 
(2) one party was not represented by independent counsel and the other party 
was represented, and the unrepresented party received from the other party 
before the agreement was signed a written summary of the terms and basic 
effects of the agreement as well as a general description of the rights he or she 
was giving up by signing the agreement. 
 
If one party was represented by independent counsel and the objecting party did 
not receive legal advice, if the provisions of section 3(2) hereof were not 
complied with, the agreement should not be enforced. 
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4. Limiting Spousal Support 
Any term in the agreement restricting the right to claim post-divorce spousal 
support is not valid if the parties during marriage raised a common biological or 
adoptive child. 
 
